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I. SUMMARY
The Real-Tlme Failure Control program involves development of a failure
detection algorithm, referred to as "System for Failure and Anomaly
Detection (SAFD)," for the Space Shutle Main Englne (SSME). This fallure
detection approach Is signal-based and It entails monitoring SSME
measurement signals based on predetermined and computed mean values and
standard deviations. Twenty-four engine measurements are included in the
algorithm and provIslons are made to add more parameters if needed. Each of
the (first) values of every measurement signal at the algorithm start is
checked against safety limits determined by a precomputed mean value (HV)+/-
and a glven multiple of a precomputed standard deviation (SO). If several
parameters exceed these limits a failure Is signalled. Ourlng the first two
seconds (after algorithm start) a moving average (MA) and a SD Is computed
on-llne, by averaging the values of each parameter In a 200 ms duration, and
Is updated at every time interval. The moving average is checked against a
similar safety band around the precomputed MV for each parameter and if
several anomalies are registered a failure Is signalled by the algorithm.
At the end of the two-second interval the HA Is fixed as the mean value for
the rest of the algorlthm operation and a safety band Is placed above and
below this value equal to a multiple of the computed SD. The MA is
continuously updated and checked agalnst this safety band. Once more if
several parameters exceed the limits a fallure is signalled. At the start
of every scheduled power transient the algorithm Is stopped. It Is
re-lnltiated after two seconds from the termlnatlon of the power translent
and the process Is repeated.
r
This final report Is divided Into slxmajor sections. The most encompassing
of all Is the discussion section that has sub-sections on: I) SAFD
algorithm development, 2) SAFO simulations, 3) DTM failure simulations, 4)
closed-loop slmulatlon, 5) SAFD current llmltatlons, and 6) enhancements
planned for. The report wlll cover background information, new
developments, and future plans for the algorithm implementation and
enhancements.
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5. INTRODUCTION
Anomalous behavior during Space Shuttle Matn Engine (SSHE) hot-ftre testtng
ts presently detected via measurement redllnes that are implemented on key
measured parameters. In order to avoid the cost incurred and the impact on
the SSHE flight schedule due to failures, it Is very desirable to have an
advanced fatlure detection system that can mlnimtze damage and that can
detect as many failures as possible, qutckly and efficiently, prior to
catastrophes. The safe operation of any complex system, such as the SSME,
rests on the reliability of the control and fault detection systems and the
speed of detection and identification of component, sensor, or actuator
failures. In the recent past, fault detection and isolation has raised the
interest of many researchers [1-7]. Host major techniques to failure
detection can be categorized as either model-based or signal-based
approaches.
Model-based techniques rely on analytical redundancy [4-8]. Analytically
generated "measurement= outputs are compared wtth hardware measurements by
using present and/or previous values of some variables In conjunction with
their mathematical relationships. The fault detection process herein
encompasses three major tasks: 1) residual generation that entatis taking
the difference between the analytical and measured values, 2) statistical
testing and signature generation, and 3) diagnostics and decision making.
On the other hand, signal-based techniques are hardware intensive and
sensor/actuator driven. In thts approach, the major undertakings include:
1) limit/trend checking by comparison of plant outputs with normal
operational limits, 2) sensor/actuator/component redundancy, whereby a
single value from measurements of several Identical sensors is used
according to some dectslon mechanism, 3) frequency spectrum analyses by
using plant measurements, wherein frequency spectrums are compared wtth
normal spectrums [9-12].
An algorithm Is hereby developed, referred to as "System for Anomaly and
Failure Detection (SAFD), m that permits fault detection during SSHE hot-ftre
testing by a simple signal-based approach.
rThe method entails monitoring the signal averages for 24 SAFD parameters and
comparing the signal averages to upper and lower signal safety limits. The
reason for monitoring the averages of signals, rather than thelr actual
values, Is to smooth or filter out most of the undeslrable effects of sensor
nolse. Moreover, the safety limits are placed above and below the fixed
average value for each parameter with a bandwidth of n*SD, where n is a
pre-determlned constant that is large enough to avoid false alarms and small
enough to make the algorithm sensltlve to actual fallures.
The SAFD algorlthm, as it Is currently configured, works during SSME
steady-state operation, starting a_ five seconds after engine start or two
seconds after the completion of each scheduled power transient. Moreover,
an added safety feature Is included that checks the value of each SAFO
parameter at the first incoming measurement against pre-determlned expected
values. In case several parameters exceed or are below their expected
values, by more than a pre-determlned margln, then a failure is signalled.
This feature will ensure the normal engine operation by identifying any
fallure that could have happened during start/power transients. Also, if
any sensor indicates a negatlve output, it is automatlcally disqualified and
eliminated from the algorithm. However, there is no means of sensor failure
detection in the present SAFD set-up.
i
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As described in the final reports of Phase I and II of the SAFD algorithm
development contract [13], the original algorithm entailed failure detection
based on three approaches. The first approach encompassed the first
two-second interval after algorithm start and tt used precomputed mean value
(MV) and standard deviation (SO) for each of the 23 parameters monitored.
The moving average (MA) was checked against safety limits, placed above and
below the fixed MV, equal to nl*SD. The RA was computed continuously from
the start of the algorithm until the end of the two-second interval and
updated at every sampling instant of 80 milliseconds (thus, at the end of
the two-second interval the MA was the average of 2 sec. worth of 25 data
points). If several parameters indicated exceedence of the safety limits
(due to the MA exceedence (Approach l)), then a failure was flagged out. At
the end of the two-second interval, the MA value was fixed and used as the
°
MV for the rest of the algorithm operation. In approach 2, the continuously
updated MA was compared to the safety limits, placed around thts MV, equal
to n2*SD. In Approach 3, the actual signal was compared to the safety
limits placed around the continuously updated MA and equal to a bandwidth of
n3*SD. Five SSME incident tests were simulated during Phase I and II [13]
and the algorithm performed well as compared to the engine redlines.
During the course of the present contract, the SAFD algorithm was refined
and modified in several areas. Namely, the safety feature for anomaly check
at the start of the algorithm, that was mentioned in the summary section
was added and the MA was reduced from a two-second average to a 200
millisecond moving average. The reason for this action was to make the MA
more sensitive to sudden changes. The on-line check for anomaly that used
the actual signal values for failure detection (Approach 2, utilized in the
original SAFO algorithm) was eliminated, since the instrumentation noise
level (excursions) could trigger false alarms. The use of a MA computed as
the average of only the most recent five signal measurement values, as
opposed to twenty-five, is more sensitive to sudden failures and the
averaging process removes most of the undesirable signal noise, thus
avoiding false alarms without having to artiflcally increase the safety
bandwidth. Some of the originally monitored engine parameters are not
currently in use (the sensors have been eliminated). Thus, the list of
measurements monitored by SAFD were updated and a new set of 24 parameters
were included. Most of the engine redlines are in this list. Moreover, the
sampling interval was reduced to 40 msec. with an option of reducing it to
20 msec, if hardware capabilities permit.
Eight SAFD algorithm simulations on actual data from SSME incident tests
were carried out during the current phase of the Real-Time Failure Control
contract. Three real incident tests and two hypothetical failures were
simulated by the SSME Digital Transient Model (DTM). Moreover, over 40
incident tests were carefully studied for useful information. Currently,
the SAFD algorithm can handle only steady-state operating conditions.
However, the start anomaly check is really a post transient failure
detection approach that will detect any anomalous developments that happen
during start or power transient. There are some other perturbations, due
either to transients llke fuel or liquid oxygen (LOX) venting and
repressurization effects or to fuel or gasseous oxygen (GOX) valve closure
effects, that makes the present SAFD approach a little sluggish, in that the
safety bandwldth has to be large enough to cover such excursions. Moreover,
there are nonllnear effects that appear In the behavior of some parameters
(such as the HPOT pump discharge temperature that takes over 60 seconds to
reach steady-state and has an excursion of over 50°F) for which special
provlslons need to be made to avold false alarms. In addltlon, the SAFD
performance Is a function of the multiplying factor n, and that of the
number of required parameters that show anomalous behavlor for an engine
shutdown decision.
Nevertheless, SAFD, as tt ts presently configured, is very effective (much
better than redltnes) in detecting slow developing failures and it is
slightly better than the redltnes in fast failures, such as structural
ruptures. Several of the SAFD advantages include: l) the requirement of a
multiple parameter anomaly for a failure decision (this avoids false
alarms), 2) the option of choosing a different bandwidth for different
parameters and even for different intervals, 3) the use of a moving average
that removes noise effects and is sufficiently short-term to enhance its
sensitivity and use of the SO and the average values, and 4) the flexibility
of the algorithm for further expansions and enhancements, among others.
; _?
There are means of modifying the algorithm that will make it more
encompassing and that will be discussed in what follows. An automated
selection of the optimal safety bandwidth and the number of anomalous
parameters required for a sure failure can be developed. Most of the
shortcomings of the SAFD algorithm can thus be eliminated and plans for
accomplishing thls will be discussed later.
Thls report covers: l) background information on past SSME failures and
problems involving their detection, 2) detailed descriptions and simulation
plots of the SAFD algorithm, 3) detailed descriptions of the DTM failure
simulations, 4) the closed-loop simulation (DTM failure simulations with the
SAFD in the loop), 5) llmltations and advantages of the algorithm, and 6)
plans for future work for the enhancement of SAFD.
The objective of the present contract is to develop a failure detection
algorithm that will enhance and refine the "failure control techniques for
the SSME" and demonstrate the operability of the SAFD algorithm in a
closed-loop manner via engine simulations. The Rocketdyne Digital Transient
-8-
Node1 (DTR) uas used to accomplish the goal. It wt11 be shown that the SAFD
algorithm is capable of detecting performance degradation and anomalous
behavior of the SSME earlier and faster than the existing redllne system.
-9-
6. DISCUSSION
Fault detection system design involves several complex issues, such as quick
response prior to significant performance degradation or damage as well as
consideration of system redundancy. Advanced fault detection algorithms,
based on careful consideration of system dynamic characteristics, can often
lead to significant reduction of hardware redundancy. There are three main
concerns in any fault detection and identification process. The primary
objective invariably is to establish that a failure has occurred with a high
degree of certainty. The type and location of failure as well as the extent
of degradation are two of the remaining concerns that should be addressed
appropriately. The principal thrust of the present algorithm involves the
fault detection problem.
6.1 BACKGROUND
There were four major tasks identified in the statement of work of the
present contract. The first task involved algorithm refinement, the
second task was on provisions for avoidance of premature cutoff, the
third task entailed simulation with the SAFD algorithm using real
incident test data, and the fourth task was related to the closed-loop
simulation of DTM on-llne with the SAFD algorithm. The initial phase of
the contract was directed towards the study and evaluation of all SSME
incident tests, identification of areas of refinement in the algorithm,
analyses of the characteristic behavior of key engine parameters and the
availability of sensors and measurements that can easily be utilized for
the algorithm implementation.
-In-
k6.l.l INCIDENTS
The occurrence of an anomaly or a failure is classified as a "major" or
a "minor' incident based on: a) the extent of damage, b) pressure,
temperature, speed and vibration levels in excess of normal end item
operating levels, and c) internal and/or external fires or explosions
[13].
SAFD Parameter Selection Criteria [14].
The compilation in Table 6.1.I is the list of all major failures or
incidents of the SSME from 1977 to the present. The Table summarizes data
on 40 failures that include: l) test number, 2) the engine number on which
failure occurred, 3) the date of anomaly, 4) duration from the start in
seconds, 5) engine power level at the time of failure, 6) brief description
of failure, q) classification of failure as major or critical, 8) the
location or unit that experienced the failure, 9) the redline parameter that
caused engine cutoff initiation, and lO) parameters, other than the redline
parameter, that showed significant change due to the failure.
Forty (40) past incident tests were reviewed, excluding tests where:
u
anomaly occurred after engine cutoff or during transient
where no striking changes were indicated.
A total of 40 tests were used to select the 24 parameters for the SAFD
algorithm. Those measurement parameters were chosen that represented "key"
aspects of SSME operation. Fifty-seven (57) measurements were examined
for: a) anomaly induced percentage change from steady-state operation, b)
rate of percentage change, c) interim from first indications of an anomaly
to cut off. Each of the above factors were weighed and accordingly, the
most appropriate parameters were selected for use in the algorithm.
A database was developed whereby all the generic and specific
characteristics of various incident tests were listed. This data was used
to evaluate the significant parameters for failure detection use.
_V• C ; Also included In the evaluatlons were fallure mode qualltative
characteristics where generic descriptions of the incident type and a sample
of Indlcative parameters were studied. Shown are examples of indicative
parameters where an anomaly induces change from the steady-state value.
These are summarized In Sectlon 6.1.1.1 as fallure investigations Including
incident and damage descriptions,
A summary of data is also presented that Includes: l) sensor measurement
standard deviations, 2) test-to-test envelope database definition, 3) data
for time-sliced value deviations from the average steady-state sensor
measurements, and 4) 31 database Inputs for each test (see Table 6.1.2).
Generated was data on engine parameters, mean values and standard deviations
from actual and simulated data, This is summarized in the form of predicted
and actual values following one another; P for predicted and A for actual.
These were all from engines with a previous record. As can be seen from
Table 6.1.2A, the predicted and the actual standard deviations are often
drastically different. Once again, looking at the HPOT discharge
temperature channel B values, the englne-to-engine standard deviation for
the predicted value at the lOg% power level is 61.01313 while the actual
value is llB.6592 (almost double).
Differences of the above mentioned nature raise the concern of using.
precomputed means and standard deviations for the SAFD. This fact ts the
fundamental reason for choosing the first incoming value of each parameter
measurement as the basis for determining the actual mean value to be used by
the SAFO during its first two-second operation rather than using a
precomputed value.
6.1.l.l SAMPLE INCIDENT DESCRIPTIONS
A sample of recent incidents are described in the following paragraphs:
l . Test No. 902-428
Scheduled Duration (SOUR) = 700 seconds
Achieved Duration (ADUR)= 204.12 seconds
Engine NO. 2106
Date: July l, 1987
Engine performance was nominal until engine start plus 163 seconds. At
163 seconds, HPOT discharge temp in Channel A (CHA) began to rise
indicating the presence of a hot streak in the OPB injector, HPOT
discharge temp in Channel B (CHB) did not respond. The hot streak was
localized and due to the rotating effect of the turbine, only a CHA
sensor responded.
Posttest examination revealed erosion of the oxidizer preburner injector
face and localized burn-through of the HPOTP turbine sheet metal
adjacent to the injector erosion area. There was no external engine
damage and heating was isolated to the areas noted above.
REDLINE PARAMETER - HPFT discharge temp sensors (231,232) dropped below
their lower limit. Pneumatic shutdown was initiated because a hydraulic
lockup was in effect (part of the test plan).
#
OTHER PARAMETERS SHOW CHANGES
87g
459-480
459-410
743
200
201
327-328
HX INT TEHP
HPFP DS PR-PREBURNER PC - AP I
HPFP DS PR-PREBURNER PC = AP I
HPOP SPEED
MCC PC AVG (new redline on this parameter was put after this
incident)
HPOP BAL CAV AP
2. Test No. 902-471
SOUR = 700 seconds
AOUR = 147.06 seconds
DATE: June 2, 1989
The LPFD #3 flex joint bellows expanded due to a D/S tripod legs break. The
tripod mtsslle ruptures a .035 = wall in the LPF duct and a leak is
initiated. Missile impacts flow straightener and comes to rest. At start
plus ]47.43 sec. a fire is observed and at 147.5B sec. the lower east
thermocouple temp exceeds redllne of 635"R. The cutoff was initiated at
]47.64 seconds.
REOLINE PARAMETER - Facility cutoff initiated by PID 1493, lower east
powerhead thermocouple redline resulting from hydrogen fire originating in
the region of the low pressure fuel duct near the HPFTP.
OTHER PARAMETERS THAT SHOW CHANGES
270 Fuel density
203,204 LPFP discharge Pr A,B
2035
827 Eng F1 tn Pr 3
821 Eng F1 in Pr 1
233 HPOT ds temp A
234 HPOT ds temp B
86 HPFP tn Pr avg
1021 Eng F1 in T
819 Eng F1 in Pr 2
43 MCC PC avg
873 LOX Tank dtsch Pr
-14-
3. Test No. 904-044
SOUR = 1337 seconds
ADUR = 1270.72 seconds
Date: 3une 23, 1989
A bearing tn the HPOTP fatled. Non-flight configuration HPOTP post shutdown
hydraulic/H2 fire due to rupture of OPB preburner bowl O below girth weld.
Pneumatic control assembly damage and main oxidizer valve actuator neck
fracture prevented valve closure, propellant shutoff by prevalves. No
facility damage, engine external mtnor fire damage, no expelled fragments,
FPB/OPB, HPFTP, LPTPs, nozzle, MCC and main tnjector showed no damage.
Powerhead damage was Isolated to oxtdtzer preburner heat exchanger bowl.
Data and hardware assessment pinpolnt source of failure to HPOTP pump and
bearings.
REDLINE PARAMETER - MCC PC CH AVG 400 PSI less than Pc Ref.
OTHER PARAMETERS THAT SHOW CHANGES
40 OPOV ACT POS
42 FPOV ACT POS
371 MCC HG IN PR
52 HPFP DS PR
656 PBP BRG BK PR
232 HPFT DS TMP
6.1.1.2 PRELIMINARY SELECTION OF TESTS FOR SAFD IMPLEMENTATION
From the list In the previous Table (6.1.1) and from test histories, a
preliminary selection of incident tests was derived for the purpose of
Implementation on the SAFD algorithm with real-test data. The selection was
based on the need to cover a wide range of fatlure types. Thus, fatlures
that have been simulated on the SAFD algorithm previously, failures that
were representative of the most critical and most recurrent anomalies, as
well as those that represented fast or slow occurring failures, were
selected. The selected list of Incidents is presented in a Table (Table
6.1.3) with their corresponding test numbers.
-16-
6.1.2 PARAMETER. IDENTIFICATION (PID) NUMBER ASSOCIATION WITH TESTS
Every individual measurement parameter is associated with a PID number for
each specific engine test. These PIO numbers often change from test to test
and from engine to engine, since in some cases, new sensors are added and in
others, existing ones are removed. Thus, the redistribution of the
measurement sensors create the need to identify the PID numbers for each
test use in order to apply test data to the SAFD algorithm.
Failure modes, according to the line replaceable units in the Failure Modes
Effects Analysis (FMEA), are listed in Table 6.1.4.
"--,4
Test data processing of the SSME includes storage of measurement data in
computer files that only accommodate g PIDs per file (meaning 9
measurements). This is apparently necessary for the failure mode effects
analysis (FMEA) that is carried out after every failure occurrence.
In order to make the above mentioned files compatible with the SAFD
algorithm and make more than 9 measurements available to the SAFD algorithm,
a conversion computer code is required.
A computer program was written entitled CONVDAT (see Table 6.1.5), that can
combine up to four (4) data files into one file (36 measurements) accessing
them on the CDC computer NOS operating system. Each of the original data
files must be transferred to the CDC system by using a special procedure and
then edited as fo11ows: I) remove all blank lines, 2) edit descriptions
into the following format - first line should give the description of the
test (engine number, date, etc.) using a maximum of 60 characters. The
second line should have the first PID number with descriptions, using a
maximum of 30 characters. The third line should have the second PID number
with descriptions, and so on, until the last PID number is covered, each
using 30 characters or less.
_J
Once all the files have been converted the CONVDAT routine can be used in
the following manner: 1) attach the first file to TAPE20, the second file
to TAPE21, the third file to TAPE22, and the fourth file to TAPE23; 2)
change the first four lines to reflect the correct accounting information.
Followlng these steps the output flle is generated In TAPE31. Change the
name of thls file; 3) update the values of the parameters on the namelist
$GIVEN, The parameters in the latter are defined as follows:
NPID1 - number of PIOs on TAPE20
NPID2 - number of PIOs on TAPE21
NPID3 = number of PIDs on TAPE22
NPID4 - number of PIDs on TAPE23
TSTART - data start time
TMAX - data stop time
Following the above mentioned steps, the CONVDAT routine can be executed and
all of the four files wtll be combined into one file.
6.l.3 UPDATING AND FINALIZATION OF SAFD MONITORED PARAMETERS
Presently, SAFD uses 24 dtstlnct outputs from SSME instruments. In the
original list of SAFD monitored parameters there were some parameters that
were totally removed from engine instrumentation or eliminated as a
redline. Such parameters are: I) injector coolant pressure (PID No. 366
non-exlstent), 2) NPOTP primary seal drain pressure (PID No. gSl, eliminated
as a redline). From the SSME FMEAs list of the highest ranking failures, 48
engine parameters were selected that encompass measurements related to
HPFTP, HPOTP, LPFTP, LPOTP, HEX, MCC, HGM, OPB, FPB, Main Injector, OPOV,
FPOV, CCV, and Nozzle. From these parameters a list of 24 of those
parameters that have the potential of indicating a failure in the shortest
possible tlme was selected as the final llst for SAFD monitoring. The lists
of the original and current SAFD monitored parameters are shown in Tables
6.1.6 and 6.1.7, respectively.
rNine of the original parameters were deleted and eleven new ones were
added. Those deleted were: 1) injector coolant pressure (366), 2) MCC HG
in Pc (367), 3) FPB Pc (410), 4) OPB Pc (480), 5) MCC CLNT Dis. Temp. (18),
6) engine OX injector pressure (85B-BS9), 7) LPOTP pump dis. pressure (302),
8) HEX inlet pressure (878), 9) HEX inlet temp. (879).
6.1.4 SSNE CRITICAL OPERATING PARAMETERS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN NOMINAL
(PREDICTED) VALUES AND ACTUAL ENGINE DATA
In Table 6.1.8, the engine parameters that are predicted prior to a test and
compared with actual data from several tests on each of three SSMEs (2107,
2011 and 2024), are summarized. The values herein are at I09% power level
and are selected at specific time instants as indicated in the Table. The
last two columns list the corresponding nominal values (those values that
are picked when a brand new engine is tested) and their engine-to-engine
standard deviations (SD) calculated from a randomly selected set of actual
hot-fire test data (the very last column). As can be seen in several of
these parameters, the difference between the actual and nominal values could
be greater than three times SD (3 sigma). Examples of these are: l) HPFP
speed, difference between nominal and actual value is about 753 rpm while
the SD is lO?; 2) HPOT DS TMP, difference between actual and nominal is
about I04 and the SD is 33; 3) OPOV position, difference between actual and
nominal is about 6.24 and SD is 1.8g. The reason for evaluating such
differences is the fact that the SAFD algorithm presently needs a
precomputed mean value for each parameter to check on failures during the
first 2-second interval after the algorithm starts. Two of the five
simulations that was performed during the Phase I and II studies, test
g01-340 was shut off due to a 'false alarm" for the only reason that the
input mean values were much further off from the actual values than 3
sigma. Thus, tf such false alarmsare to be avoided as much as possible, it
is more Judicious to choose a mean value that is closest to the first
incoming measurement output for each parameter that can be picked up at the
very start of the SAFO algorithm, as soon as the measurements are sensed.
The final approach to such a choice of the starting mean value should be
decided upon after careful analyses of existing mean value predictions and
their corresponding SDs.
6.l .5 CHARACTERISTIC EFFECTS OF PRESURIZATION AND VENTING ON SAFD
PARAMETERS
During SSME testing, the LOX tank or the fuel tank, or both are either
pressurized or vented several times during the course of a test in virtually
every test. These pressurizations/ventings effect some of the parameter
values over and above the power level variation effects. Thus, at least
eleven of the 24 new SAFD monitored parameters are effected by the
ventlng/pressurization of especially the oxygen tank. Moreover, closure of
the fluid or the GOX repressurlzatlon valves also has some effects on
parameters such as the HPOP and the low pressure fuel pump speed, as well as
the FPOV actuator position (see Figures l and 2). Analyses on various
engine data with and without LOX venting was carried out and the results are
summarized in Table 6.1.9. Clearly, almost all parameters are effected, but
only about half are significantly influenced to be considered in
simulations. Well-defined plans exist to incorporate the effects of such
venting and pressurizations as well as of repressurizatlon valve closures on
the SAFD parameters using existing SSME 'influence coefficients." Thus, a
special formula exists that will provide the actual value of any SSME
parameter under a given power level and at steady-state conditions. This
formula will be utilized to compute varying averages (in a piecewise linear
manner) for those parameters effected and a safety band will then be placed
around the actual average value of the parameters. This will provide a much
healthier approach to failure detection under the above mentioned
perturbations.
6.1.5.1 TIME-SLICE TO TIME-SLICE STANDARD DEVIATION VARIATIONS DUE TO LOX
VENTING
A separate study was undertaken to assess the influence of LOX venting on
various SSME parameters under various time interval calculations of the
standard deviations (SO). As expected, when the SO of most parameters were
calculated during very short time intervals (less than l second) the values
obtained were low. However, the SO steadies as it is calculated during
intervals longer than I second. Some parameters show an increase in SD due
to transient effects, such as LOX venting, while others show a decrease.
Moreover, all parameters show a level of stabilization of the SDs after two
-Pn-
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seconds. Thts ts a relevant result, stnce tn the present SAFD algorithm the
SD for each parameter will be calculated on-line durtng the first two
seconds from the start of the algorithm. Thus, the two-second interval
calculated SD should be close to the actual slice-to-slice englne SO.
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6.2 SAFD AL6ORITHR AND SIMULATIONS
The orlglnal configuration of the SAFD algorithm encompassed three
approaches to failure detection. The first, Approach l, used during the
flrst two-second period from the termination of a translent, involves
utilizing precomputed average values and standard deviations (SD) for each
parameter and settlng up a 3-times-the-standard-devlatlon band above and
below the average values for llmlt checking. Thus if a signal violates
these band limits then a warning would be flagged out. If several of such
flags are available at any instant, engine cutoff is initiated.
In Approach 2, the average value calculated for each parameter during the
flrst two-second perlod after a power transient was fixed at the end of the
two-second interval for the rest of the steady-state operating regime.
Moreover, the moving average (MA) taken during the first two-second interval
was continuously updated every 80 m1111seconds durlng the course of
algorithm operation (by dropping its last/earllest measurement and picking
up and addlng the current value of the Incomlng measurement and thus,
calculating the new MA). The last MA for each parameter value was compared
wlth Its corresponding limits for faults. The llmlts hereln were narrowed
down to one precomputed SO above and below the averages. The third,
Approach 3, also used the same safety band of one SO on each side of the
average for 11mlt checking but it utlllzed the on-llne real-time runnlng
average instead of the fixed one as a mean value. Herein actual data was
used for comparison wlth the limits. The latter two approaches were active
after the first two-second Interval of algorithm start.
The above three approaches were carefully studied and analyzed and it was
concluded that the two-second long running average ts too insensitive to
changes in the SSME. Thus, it was decided to compute HAs at each
measurement step (40 milliseconds tn CAOS output with an option of 20
milliseconds, hardware permitting), for five (or 10) of the last consecutive
measurements and to continuously update It by dropping the very last
(earliest) of the measurements and adding on the current value to get the
average of each parameter. Moreover, a standard deviation is also computed
on-line real-time during the first two-second interval after algorithm start
r
and that value is used to arrive at a 2N* SD bandwidth for limit/trend
checking (N*SD above and one below the average value). However, to
determine the validity of such an approach, values of SDs (engine-to-engine,
run-to-run, slice-to-slice) from actual test data were evaluated by
computing them from various time slices, wtth different sampling intervals,
to find out about their variations. This helped determine if the standard
deviation from an initial two-second data of a steady-state condition does
actually reflect the true standard deviation of the whole steady-state
period of the monitored parameters and if such an approach will not lead to
premature cutoff. It was found that N has to be quite large in some cases
in order to provide a sufficiently large bandwidth that will avoid false
alarms. This is due to the fact that the calculated SD reflects only the
sensor noise levels and does not include the effects of other excursions due
to transients (such as repressurizatfon or venting) and nonlinear behavior.
Also, work was performed on sensitivity studies regarding the effect of
averaging intervals on the average values and the overall performance of the
SAFD algorithm.
5.2.1 SAFD OB3ECTIVE AND SCOPE
The main objective of the Real-Time Failure Control contract is to develop a
real-tlme failure detection algorithm that Is slgnal-based and that detects
anomalous behavlor of the SSNE earlier than the existing redllne system,
The SAFD works, as it currently stands, only during SSHE steady-state test
conditions. It uttltzes both low and high frequency measurement stgnals
from 24 key parameters that are currently monitored. However, the option of
expanding the monitored parameter list would not require extensive effort.
Eight of these parameters are factltty and 16 are CADS. All major redllne
parameters are included in the SAFD, based on the fact that all these are
key to a safe engine operation.
6.2.2 THECURRENTSAFDALGORITHM
The SAFD algorithm in its present configuration starts at S seconds after a
start transient or 2 seconds after the completion of a scheduled power
transient. As a safety feature, the first measurement values (after
algorithm start) of all the 24 monitored parameters are checked against
safety limits formed by placing a safety band of N*SDp, where N is a
predetermined multiplying factor (normally 4) and SD is the precomputed
P
SD. If several parameters (the number of which should be decided prior to a
test, usually between 3 and 6) violate these limits then an engine shutdown
is signalled. This check will detect any anomalous behavior that could have
developed during start or a power transient. If no failures are detected at
the first instant then the measurement values of the 24 parameters are
chosen as the mean values for the next 2-second interval of the algorithm
operation. During this time an on-line real-time SD and a moving average
(MA) is calculated that is the average of 200 milliseconds worth of data for
each parameter. This MA is updated at every sampling interval (40
milliseconds for the CADS and 20 milliseconds for the facility) by dropping
the iast value of the measurements and picking up and adding on the most
recent one. This MA is checked against a safety band formed by placing
safety limits around the above mentioned fixed average (the first incoming
measurement value) of Nl* SDp bandwidth (where Nl is a weighting
factor normally taken to be 3). If several parameters simultaneously
indicate anomalous behavior then engine shutdown is signalled.
If no anomalies are detected during this two-second interval then the last
computed HA is fixed as the mean value (MV) for each particular parameter
for the rest of the algorithm operation (until another scheduled power
transient). A safety band is formed around this fixed MV by placing limits
above and below it of N2* SOc (where N2 is a weighting factor and
SD is the calculated SO). Then the on-line MA, that is continuously
c
being updated, is checked against these safety limits at every sampling
interval. If several parameters indicate violation of the safety limits
then engine shutdown is signalled.
This process is stopped at every scheduled power transient and is re-started
two seconds after the completion of these power transients. For a visual
picture of the algorithm operation see the schematic in Figure 3.
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6.2.3 SAFO REFINEMENTS
The SAFD algorithm was further modified (from its Phase I and II condition)
to incorporate all the 24 newly selected parameters (Table 6.I.?) and to
accommodate the 200 millisecond MA and the SD calculated during the first
two-second interval. Moreoever, actual test data from incident tests was
transferred to the CDC system and all the errors and discrepancies in the
data files were eliminated for processing. Most of these tests resulted in
a premature redline cutoff due to a failure. Test data was then combined
into two data files, one for the facility data and the other for the
controller data. A SAFD input file that included most of the 24 SAFD
parameters, was also prepared for each test and the algorithm was executed.
Several adjustments are always needed (during SAFD simulations with real
test data) for the data to be completely usable by the SAFD under all power
levels.
Modifications: to the model were made to incorporate new failure detection
shutdown criteria over the first two-second interval following a scheduled
transient. The new approach Involves using the first measurement data as
the mean value of each parameter in the shutdown logic for this interval. A
set of precomputed SO values for the new parameter list must be selected and
incorporated into the model for each test. These SO values are required for
the one-time comparison with the "nominal" (to check for anomaly) and for
the shutdown logic over the two-second interval following a transient.
Moreover, the only time nominal values for key SAFD parameters will be
needed is during the first instant when the actual measurement data is
received. Here the nominal will be compared with the actual and if the
difference Is greater than 4 SO, this wlll be considered anomalous
behavior. During the follow-on work logic wlll be included so that the
model will accommodate transient behavior, occurring as a result of
scheduled LOX and fuel venting, without interpreting these transient
behavior occurrences as failures.
The above mentioned (Phase I and II) three fundamental approaches were
considered in the refinement the SAFD algorithm, as was described earlier.
o.
The underlying purpose of these refinements was to enhance the algorithm
performance, especlally for avoidance of premature cutoff. One of the
prlnclpal reasons for premature engine cutoff Is sensor failure. The SAFD
currently does not address this type of failure. Thus, special algorithmic
and software tools need to be studied that can increase the capability of
the $AFO algorithm to address sensor failures. One way to accomplish
detection of sensor failures is to consider a single anomalous output as due
to the failure of the corresponding instrument while all the remaining
outputs are normal. This approach needs to be studied further and such
cases should be simulated with the transient model.
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Additional refinements to the SAFD algorithm were also looked at. One such
refinement Is the new "slope-average approach," which entails monitoring the
slopes between consecutive averages. Thus, the difference between each pair
of consecutive averages is divided by the time interval separating them and
the answer is considered as the slope-average. The advantage of such an
approach is that it produces very sensitive outputs of signals that have
minimal noise (since the sensor noise is "filtered" out by taking
averages). Moreover, anomalous trends can easily be detected through
evaluation of the slgn of the slope-average and whenever there is a trend of
positive or negative slopes for a few consecutive intervals, then there is a
potential failure. This approach needs to be carefully simulated for
evaluation relative to failure detection and sensitivity to failures.
Preliminary simulations were carried out on actual incident test data and
plots were generated for various parameters. The plots show the parameter
signal, the on-line average, and the fixed average, as well as the
slope-average. Moreover, the plots indicate that the slope-average could be
used as a reliable indicator of anomalous behavior with the potential of
earlier detection compared to the $AFO algorithm in some cases. For
example, the increasingly positive trend of the slope-average of the three
parameters shown in Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C beginning at about 209 seconds,
indicate that the slope-average approach could provide detection of the
particular transient at an earlier time than the SAFO algorithm. The
slope-average profiles suggest that this test could have been shut down
earlier, perhaps at about 209 seconds, as opposed to the SAFD algorithm
cutoff time of 214.?g seconds.
6.2.3.1 SAFDREFINEMENT COMPARISONS
In order to compare the performance of the SAFD algorithm with and without
refinements, two SSME hot-fire tests (901-284 and 901-364) were considered.
Three cases for each test were simulated (Cases I,II,III). The first of
these tests was a failure that occurred during the first lO-second period
due to a Lee Jet anomaly. This caused the measurement values of parameters
to be off nominal and eventually the redlines cut the engine off at 9.8B
seconds. The original SAFD simulation had used a recomputed nominal MV and
SDs as well as actual test values for five of the parameters as follows:
P_rameter Precomputed Mean Actual Value SD
~ ,kF_"
I. HB InJ. delta P 255 151.2B 24.53
2. HPFT delta P 1860 1270.5 20.
3. HPOTP delta P 1800 918.5B 46.5
4. MCC Pc 2995 1829.5 21.2
5. MCC clnt dis. temp. 420 757.97 6.3
Variations between the actual values and the precomputed mean for each of
these parameters being larger than three (3) times SO, the original SAFD
algorithm cut off the engine after the first iteration. A similar "false
alarm' occurred in test 901-340 simulations with the SAFD algorithm. In
order to evaluate the algorithm performance, Approach 1 (working during the
first 2-second interval) was shut off and Approach 2 and 3 were used. With
the original SAFO algorithm, engine cutoff occurred at B.86 seconds while
with a 200 msec running average and an on-line computed SD, the cutoff was
at 7.94 sec and ?.14 sec respectively. Similarly for test 901-364 (see
Table 6.2.1).
In the above mentioned three cases for each test, the following were
performed:
_._jl
I) In Case I, a precomputed SO and the 2-second (50 measurement) MA
were used for limit checking at each 40 millisecond interval.
0"/
%, 2) In Case II, a precomputed SO was used during the first 2-second
interval and a band of 3-SO was put below and above the precomputed
MV (as in Case I); but after the 2 seconds the SD, that was
computed during the first 2 seconds, was welghted and used for
asslgnlng similar but lower limits. The limit checks were again
performed by the 2-second (50 measurement) MA every 40 milliseconds.
3) Case III tnvolves a 200 millisecond HA (every 5 measurements) but
also a calculated (durlng the first 2-seconds) SD weighted
appropriately and used to assign limits around the calculated mean
value.
Test 901-364 was used once again, to compare performance of SAFD with and
without refinements. Thus, even though there was no failure at 216.71
seconds (the original point of SAFD Phase II simulation cutoff), the signals
were showing a trend that provided a good base to check the algorithm
performance. It should be pointed out that there was a LOX tank
pressurization at 200 sec. and this was the reason for the trending of many
of the parameters that were used to test SAFD. However, there was a real
failure that was detected by the engine redlines at 293.15 sec., which was
or was not related to this transient effect. As far as the algorithm is
concerned, these kinds of transient signals are similar to actual failures
in behavior and can be used to do some performance and sensitivity
analysis. The actual failure was also analyzed through the algorithm to
compare with the redline.
In Tables 6.2.1 and 6.2.2A,B,C,D,E,F, a comparison can be made of the N2*o
values (upper/lower signal limits defined by mean ± N2*o) between Case I
and Cases II and III. For most parameters, the N2*o values are larger for
Case I compared to Cases II and III, yielding more generous upper and lower
signal limits. Upper/lower signal limits as close to the signal mean as
possible, without being so restrictive as to trigger a false alarm, are
desired to facilitate SAFD failure detection at the earliest possible time.
The simulation results for the three cases, for each of the two tests, are
presented in the above mentioned Tables.
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6.2.4 SAFD ALGORITHM SIMULATIONS
Several cases of real-test data from major incidents were applied to the
SAFD algorithm to evaluate and understand its strengths and weaknesses.
Also, sensitivity studies were carried out to evaluate the effects of:
I) averaging at 40 msec., 80 msec., 120 msec., intervals; 2) the weighting
factor N for the determination of the safety bandwidth for each parameter;
and 3) the number of anomalous parameters required for a decision for engine
shutdown. The results of the simulations are presented in what follows.
6.2.4.1 ALGORITHM SIMULATION OF TEST 750-285
\
SAFO model simulation results of SSME hot-fire test 750-285 are presented
herein. Tests 750-285 experienced a premature engine shutdown due to the
development of a small fuel leak downstream of the main fuel valve in
downcomer #8 around 204 seconds following start. The fuel leak resulted in
a fire and was detected by a powerhead thermocouple redllne, triggering an
engine shutdown at 223.56 seconds. This test was conducted over a single
power level (109%) and did not involve propellant venting and
repressurizatlon, or propellant transfer.
SAFO model simulation was initiated at lO0 seconds following engine start.
Since the fuel leak was small, only a small number of parameters were
affected. Seventeen of the twenty-four SAFD parameters were available for
simulation. About eight of these parameters appear to reflect the failure.
For each set of figures, the Figure 5-I shows the measurement signal, and
the Figure 5-2 shows the SAFO signal average and upper/lower signal limits.
Several simulation runs were made while varying the signal upper/lower
limits (i.e,, varlatlons in n) for each of the eight parameters which appear
to reflect the failure. The best of the simulation runs obtained resulted
tn SAFO shutdown at 212.48 seconds, compared to the redllne shutdown at
223.56 seconds, due to detected anomalies in the oxidizer preburner oxidizer
valve (OPOV) actuator position, the HPFTP coolant liner pressure, and the
HPOTP intermediate seal purge pressure. Table 6.2.3 shows the composition
of the signal limits (defined by AVG ±n*SD) for selected parameters, i.e.,
the average, standard deviation, and n values. The average and standard
deviation values are computed over the first two seconds of the algorithm
operation and are fixed at the end of this interval. The signal limits can
be adjusted by varying the values for n. A careful review of Figures 5A-l
through 5H-2 will reveal that an attempt to reduce the SAFD signal limit
bandwidths wlll result in a false alarm. This is the case when an attempt
is made to reduce the signal limit bandwldths for those parameters that
appear to reflect the failure (Figures 5AI through 5H2). A false alarm
would result due to signal average variations prior to the real anomaly
occurrence.
As an example, consider the parameter of Figure 5F1-2, the low pressure
oxidizer pump discharge pressure. While Figure 5Fl indicates the anomaly
should be detectable sometime following 205 seconds, Figure 5F2 reveals that
because of the signal limit values In relation to the signal average,
reducing the signal limits by lowering the value for n would result in a
false alarm by the upper limit prior to detection of the real anomaly by the
lower limit. This of course Is a direct result of the particular average
value used In the signal limit definition of this parameter.
Values for two of the algorithm variables - #P (number of simultaneously
occurring anomalous parameters required for shutdown) and n (factor which
determines signal 11mlts) - must be predetermined. The values selected for
these variables can affect the algorithm's performance dramatically, In
terms of both its reliability and Its advantage over the redline technique.
Selection of the #P value should be large enough to insure a reliable and
accurate failure detection, yet small enough to allow the algorithm to
respond to a potential failure early. Selection of the n value is critical
to reasonable signal limits for the parameters. If the selection for n is
too sma11, the signal limit bandwidths will be too small, possibly resulting
In a false anomaly detection. An unnecessarily large selection for n will
not facilitate early anomaly detectlon and may even prevent detection of
anomalous behavior. Selection of a value for n to serve all parameters
optimally is difficult since the signal amplitudes and frequencies of
osclllatlon vary greatly among the parameters. However, ideas exist that
wlll lead to the development of an automated approach to the selection of n
and #P that can be worked on during the next phase of this program.
Simulation results for test 750-285 reveal that a single n value should not
be used for all parameters to achieve accurate results. It is necessary to
optimally choose an n value appropriate for the behavior of each parameter.
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6.2.4.2 ALGORITHM SIMULATIONS OF TESTS 901-340 AND 902-471
SAFD model simulation results of two SSME hot-fire tests which experienced
failure are presented herein. Test 901-340 involved failure of the high
pressure fuel turbine (HPFT) and was shut down at 405.5 seconds by %he HPFT
discharge temperature redline. Engine damage incurred included HPFT
turnaround duct wall fractures and torn sheet metal, and secondary rotor
platform seal fractures. The results of simulating this test with the SAFD
algorithm are presented in Table 6.2.4. Four simulation runs, involving
algorithm cutoff by Approach 2, are shown for variations in the Approach 2
signal upper/lower limits (i.e., variations in n2) and in the number of
parameters experiencing anomalous behavior simultaneously required for the
algorithm to signal a shutdown (i.e., variations in #P). The three cases
for n2=26 and #P=6,7 and B resulted in test shutdown by Approach 2 (after
the first two-second interval) at 279.67 and 295.42 seconds for #P=6 and 7,
respectively. The case for #P=B did not result in a shutdown, however,
indicating that fewer than eight parameters had signals outside of their
respective upper/lower limits simultaneously at any given time. A case was
also simulated with a slightly larger bandwidth around the signal mean
(n2=27) with #P=7. For this case, the algorithm signalled a cutoff at 29B.7
seconds, later than the comparison case for n2=26 and #P=7, which had a
cutoff of 295.42 seconds. The simulation results for selected parameters
for the case with n2-26 and #P=7 are shown graphically in Figures 6AI,A2
through 6FI,F2. Both the parameter measurement signals and the algorithm
signal means, with the earliest anomaly time, are shown. For the case with
n2=27, i.e., larger bandwidths around the means, and #P=7, some of the
parameters reached their respective signal limits at slightly later times.
The second simulation was of test g02-471 which involved a hydrogen fire
originating in the region of the low pressure fuel duct near the HPFTP due
to a leak. This test was shut down prematurely at 147.68 seconds, initiated
by the lower east powerhead thermocouple redline. The simulation was
performed for the hot-fire test data from 50 seconds, at I00% power level,
to the time of the redllne cutoff at 147.68 seconds, at I04% power level.
The power leve] change from 100% to I04% was at 140 seconds. Since the
algorithm is for steady-state operation only, slmulation was performed in
two stages corresponding to the two power levels. Simulation for the first
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stage was from 50 to 13g seconds, and for the second stage was from 145 to
147.6B seconds. The simulation results are presented in Table 6.2.5. Seven
simulation runs are shown for variations in nl, i.e., in the Approach l
signal limits, and in #P. In all cases, the algorithm signalled a shutdown
by Approach I during the second power level (I04_). There are five cases
for ni-2.5 and #P=4,5,6,7 and 8 showing the later algorithm shutdown times
as a result of increasing the number of simultaneous anomalous parameters
required for algorithm shutdown. A simulation run was also made for nl=2.0
and #P=6 which resulted in a premature shutdown by the algorithm. This case
indicates the signal limits did not encompass a large enough bandwidth
around the mean. A simulation run performed for ni-3.5 and #P=6 in which
the algorithm did not trigger a shutdown indicates the bandwidth was too
large. The simulation results for selected parameters for the case with
ni-2.5 and #P=8 are shown graphically in Figures ?A through 71. The
parameter measurement signals are shown indicating the earliest anomaly time
for the respective parameters as detected by the algorithm. Both of the
above tests were without venting/pressurizatlon.
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6.2.5 HEURISTIC EVALUATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Several simulation runs were carried out using the SAFD algorithm on SSME
test data from test 901-340. During this test a redline shutdown occurred
at 405.5 seconds from start due to a HPFTP failure (HPFTP turnaround duct
bulged cracked and tore). The original SAFD algorithm simulations had
engine cutoff after 0.08 sec. from the start of the algorithm, which of
course, was a "false alarm.' The false alarm was apparently due to the
large difference between the precomputed mean values for the various engine
parameters monitored by SAFO and the actual values from the test data.
Thus, in order to avoid such premature cutoff, mean values closer to the
actual data were selected and, using three times the standard deviations
(SD), safety bands were set around each, to be used for the first two-second
interval. Moreover, SDs were computed on-line during the first two seconds
of the SAFD running and were used (after multiplication with an appropriate
factor N2) to set the safety band around the monitored parameters. The
measurement signal averages were also completed during the same interval and
the value obtained fixed as the working mean value throughout the
simulation. The comparative averages were updated every 40-millisecond
interval using the latest SO values. Presently, the last S values will only
be utilized for an updating of the above mentioned averages every 200
milliseconds (eventually, when data is available every 20 milliseconds, the
last I0 values will be used to update the average every 20-millisecond
interval).
Various sensitivity analyses were performed on this test by varying the
multiplication factor N2 on the SO as well as the number of parameters,
experiencing anomalous behavior that was required for the SAFD algorithm to
trigger engine shutdown. Some of the results are presented in Table 6.2.6.
The SAFD simulation results for the four different runs are presented in
Tables 6.2.7A through 6.2.70 while Figures 8A through 81 show the signal
profiles for some of the parameters. As shown in Table 6.2.6, varying N2
and the number of parameters required for shutdown effect the outcome.
Thus, appropriate values for each of these should be carefully selected.
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6.3 SSME DIGITAL TRANSIENT MODEL FAILURE SIMULATIONS
The SSME digital transient model (DTM) was used to simulate actual SSME test
failures. The SSME transient model is a modular digital computer program
which is being run on the CONVEX computer uslng a SUN workstation as the
front end system. This particular version of the model has evolved from 25
years of simulating rocket engine transient performance. Several
generations of engines have been simulated and great confidence is placed in
the predictions of these transient models.
The simulations of real engine failures were done for the following
reasons. First, as a preface for the use of the model, on-line with the
SAFD algorithm, to create a closed-loop demonstration of the SAFD
algorithm's capabilities. Second, to galn increased confidence in the
model's ability to simulate engine failures, and third, to use the SSME
transient model to simulate certain failure modes that are hypothetical and
have not occurred on actual engines.
6.3.1 DTM SIMULATION OF TEST 901-284
Several of the actual engine failures were simulated by the SSME DTM. The
description of the failures and examples of the model output for each of
these tests are presented with heuristic evaluations.
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The effort to simulate measurement and component failures took longer than
expected. The fundamental difficulties In simulating actual failures by
using the SSME digital transient model entail: I) imperfect matching of
parameter variations caused by actual failures with the simulated values due
to the highly nonlinear dynamics of the SSME, 2) errors In the predictions
of the actual source or cause of failure from effect. Thus, if the cause of
a failure is pinpointed exactly, then the simulations will indicate very
closely matched behavior relative to the actuals. However, even if the
exact cause of a failure in the system is known, being nonlinear as it is,
it is very difficult to get I00% correlation between actual and simulated
behavior.
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In certain situations, the inverse approach is more efficient. Namely, to
start with the effects and to try to get to the cause, as in the case of
efficiency variations. However, the SSME, being very complex and having
nonlinear dynamics, there are multiple causes that could result in certain
effects and vice versa.
6.3.2 TEST 901-284
During the incident test 901-284 the following failure was experienced:
l • Channel B of the controller cut itself off at 3.25 seconds.
Channel B shutdown was caused by failure of electronic components
in the facility power supply.
o At 3.9 sec, the Lee Jet orifice, used to purge Channel A Pc
transducer passage, became dislodged and caused the Pc transducer
to sense MCC coolant flow pressure instead of Pc. This erroneously
high reading (3800 psi) caused the controller to close the OPOV to
reduce Pc to the desired 3012 psi. A few milliseconds later, the
controller calculated a mixture ratio of g.O and commanded the FPOV
full open in an attempt to reduce the MR to 6.D.
a. The immediate results of the controller action, based on an
erroneous Pc, was operation in an abnormal mode, characterized
by high fuel flow and low turbine inlet temperatures of the OPB
and FPB. In fact, the OPB inlet temperature fell quickly to
about 440°R (-20°F) which assured freezing of the water which
makes up lOg of the total 40 Ibs/sec.
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bo The ultimate result of the controller actions was a fire in the
HPOTP at g.7 sec due to rubbing in the area of the LOX primary
seal slinger. The rubbing was caused by a high axial load
which dlsplaced the rotor assembly at the pump end of the HPOTP
housing. This high axial load was caused by ice formation in
the cavity between the housing and the 2rid stage turbine wheel
which resulted in reduction in the cavity pressure from about
2500 pst to near ambtent. Thts reduced pressure on one side of the
turbtne wheel and caused an estimated tncrease tn rotor axtal force of
about 31,000 lbs, whtch far exceeded the control capability of the
balance ptstons to control the posttton of the rotor.
Plots were generated from simulated data of the above mentioned test and
overlayed on actual plots from real-test data (see Figures 9A-9L). The
parameters tndtcate very close matchtng of real data with simulated data,
thus Indicating the accuracy of the DTM.
_,
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6.3.3 TEST 902-428
Computer simulation results of the incident test 902-428 are presented in
this subsection. At the 163rd-second from engine start of this test, the
OPB injector experienced a hot streak. Thus, the HPOT discharge temperature
channel B (PID No. 234) sensor indicated significantly higher than normal
temperature reading throughout the test.
Figure IOA shows the main combustion chamber pressure model with the test
data overlayed. Figure 10B has the overlays of the HPOT discharge
temperature, channel A. Figure 10C has the HPOT discharge temperature
channel B reduced by 170°R (due to it running 170=R over normal) overlayed
with the Digital Transient Model (DTR) results. The heat exchanger
interface temperature (HXIT) was one of the parameters where the failure was
dramatically exhibited. The present configuration of the DTR output does not
include this parameter. But for thts case, the DTM was modified to tnclude
this parameter as an output. The actual HXIT is measured during hot-fire
tests only after oxidizer coolant is mixed Into the flow, which then
reflects a slightly different value. Hence, the model value only is shown
in Figure IOD. For a comparison between the actual HXlT and the model,
Table 6.3.1 below represents the percentage change of the parameter value
during the time interval shown (column 1), the value calculated by the model
(volumn 2), the net percentage change occurring from first to the second
time-Instant (column 3), the actual measurement values (column 4) and the
net percentage change (colume 5). In Figures lOE, IOF, and lOG, overlays of
chamber mixture ratio, fuel preburner and oxidizer preburner pressures are
presented, respectively.
TABLE 5.3.1
TIRE HOOEL TEST
TOT2RIX HX TEHP 879
Value A% Value &Z
160 1335 .... 915 ....
170 1340 0.37 920 0.55
180 1350 1.12 930 1.64
185 1355 1.50 g34 2.08
190 1320 -1.12 940 2.73
195 1225 -8.24 glO -0.55
200 1165 -12.73 847 -7.43
6.3.4 TEST750-285
Simulations of the incident test 750-285 that occurred on the SSME on
May 21, 1987, on engine 0210 while operating at 109% power level are
presented herein. The test was cut off prematurely at 223.6 seconds of a
planned 295 seconds, when the powerhead temperatures at the CCV and HPFP
exceeded the redline setting of 660°R. At approximately 204 seconds Into
the test, the nozzle #8 downcomer began to leak hydrogen. The posttest
analysis indicated leakage flow to be between .5 and l Ib/sec, but because
of the complex geometry and difficult access to the downcomer, an accurate
leak size assessment was precluded. The nozzle was replaced before the next
test.
In order to model this failure, a flow path was added to the calculation of
flow exiting the downcomer area. This additional flow was set to equal the
leakage flow. The leakage flow that was included in the pre-test notes of
the next test was initially input in the model. This flow had a maximum
leakage of .6 Ib/sec. This amount of leakage had a negligible effect on the
DTM engine parameters and did not match the test data. Next, the leakage
flow was doubled and the model was re-run. The amount of leakage the model
experienced is shown in Figure IIA. This has a maximum of 1.2 Ibs/sec,
close to what the posttest analysis indicated. This amount of leakage
caused the model engine parameters to match better with the test data.
Figure lib shows the high pressure fuel turbine discharge temperature traces
from the test data and the transient model. The transient model trace has
150°R added to it. This was done because the test 750-285 ran at a higher
temperature than is nominal for this power level. The relevant part of this
plot is the temperature trend. Figure 11C shows the high pressure oxidizer
turbine discharge temperature traces from the test data and the transient
model. The transient model trace has 90°R added to it, for the same reason
as mentioned above. Figure I10 shows the oxidizer preburner oxidizer valve
"position traces from the test data and the transient model. The dead band
for this valve is a few tenths, so this is a good correlation between the
test and the model. Figure 11E shows the main combustion chamber pressure
traces from the transient model and the test data. Figure IIF shows the
engine mixture ratio traces from the test data and the transient model.
6.4 SSME DTM HYPOTHETICAL FAILURE SIMULATIONS
There are various potential failures that have never occurred. It would be
desirable for the SAFD algorithm to have the capability of detecting any
such failure. Thus, a study was performed that entails use of the SSME DTM
to simulate the aforementioned types of failures. The intent is to utilize
the resulting simulation on the closed-loop (DTM-SAFD) system and assess the
performance of the SAFD algorithm In detecting such hypothetical failures.
While the DTM provides on-line engine data to the algorithm.
Leakage of fuel or oxidizer Is one of the major incidents that could be
catastrophic and that Is hard to detect. Moreover, the quantity of
fuel/oxldizer leakage that can be tolerated, so that the engine could
continue to run satisfactorily, depends on the location of the leak. Thus,
if a fuel leak is Just downstream of the main fuel valve (MFV) its effect
will be divided among the three parallel flow paths that branch from the MFV
discharge duct. These include the main combustion chamber and the nozzle
cooling channels, and the coolant control valve. Therefore, quite a large
leak can sometimes occur without having a major impact on any one flow
parameter. If, on the other hand, a leak occurs Just upstream of the low
pressure fuel turbine, its effect will be significant on one flow path.
Hence, small leaks can only be tolerated in such instances. It should be
noted that any fuel leaks are hazardous and should be detected as early as
possible.
6.4.1 RUPTURE IN OXIOIZER PREBURNER PUMP AREA
V
Simulating leaks with the OTM requires some effort of modifying several
parts of the model by introducing additional flow paths. In such an
undertaking, a rupture In the SSME oxidizer preburner pump area was
simulated. The rupture was assumed to take place on the oxidizer side,
downstream of the preburner pump (see Figure 12). An additional flow path
for the leak, that would flow from the ruptured area, was incorporated in
the model.
Three separate runs of the model were made, with a leakage of 1 Ib/sec and
5 Ib/sec leakage. The results of each run are presented in Figures 12A
through 123 and 12K through 12T, respectively. The engine power level was
assumed to be I04_ during the leakage initiation time at 30.0 seconds, after
system steady-state is reached. The engine control system compensated for
the leakage flow by opening the OPOV and FPOV (see Figures 7,8,17, and IB.
The engine was back up to nominal value in a short time, about l second.
The following is a list of the parameter descriptions and the figure numbers
of the attached traces.
PARAMETER DESCRIPTION FIGURE NUMBER
l LB/SEC
Fuel Preburner Temperature 12A
Oxidizer Preburner Temperature 12B
Oxidizer Preburner Pressure 12C
Main Combustion Chamber Pressure 12D
HPOP Discharge Pressure 12E
HPFP Discharge Pressure 12F
FPOV Position 12G
OPOV Position lZH
Boost Pump Discharge Pressure 121
Main Chamber Mixture Ratio 123
5 LB/SEC
12K
12L
12M
12N
120
12P
12O
12R
12S
12T
A Table (Table 6.4.1) was compiled that shows the effect of each leakage
flow (I Ib/sec, and 5 Ib/sec) on each of the parameters studied. The effect
is defined as the percent change from nominal.
6.4.2 HPFT DISCHARGE FLOW BLOCKAGE
One such failure that involves the HPFT discharge flow blockage, taken from
FMEA files, was simulated with the DTM. The blockage was assumed to occur
between the High Pressure Fuel Turbine and the Main Injector
(see Figure 13A). The amount of blockage was initially set to five times
the resistance of the flow path. The engine power level was assumed to be
104% prior to the failure. The failure was initiated at 30.5 seconds, and
the model was run from 29 to 39 seconds. The engine control system
compensated for the blockage by changing the OPOV and FPOV positions (see
Figures 13M, 13N). The following is a list of the parameter descriptions
and the Figure numbers of the attached traces:
PARAMETER DESCRIPTION FIGURE
Fuel Preburner Temperature
Oxidizer Preburner Temperature
Fuel Preburner Pressure
Oxidizer Preburner Pressure
Main Combustion Chamber Pressure
HPOP Discharge Pressure
HPFP Discharge Pressure
LPFP Speed
HPFP Speed
LPOP Speed
HPOP Speed
FPOV Position
OPOV Position
HPFT Discharge Temperature
HPOT Discharge Temperature
Main Chamber Mixture Ratio
Main Chamber Temperature
13B
13C
13D
13E
13F
13G
13H
13I
13J
13K
13L
13M
13N
130
13P
13Q
13R
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6.5 CLOSED-LOOP DTM - SAFD SIMULATIONS
In order to demonstrate the operability of the failure detection algorithm
the SAFO was combined with the DTM in such a way that the DTM output was
used as inputs to the SAFD algorithm. Any anomalous behavior that effects
some of the parameter values can thus be detected by the SAFD if these
values are over the limits of the safety bands that are set for each of the
parameters. For this purpose, the SAFD failure detection model was combined
with the SSME transient model to form a closed-loop system model. The idea
behind creating the closed-loop system model is to be able to simulate any
failures with the transient model and monitor the parameter signals for
anomalous behavior wlth the SAFD algorithm on-line and real-time.
Modifications to the code of both models were required for their
combination, For example, subroutine SENSOR of the SAFD model, which reads
in the SSME hot-flre test data from input files, has been eliminated as it
has no purpose in the closed-loop model. The parameter signals generated by
the transient simulation model subroutines will be available to the SAFD
subroutines through common blocks and can, therefore, be monitored for
anomalies with the SAFD algorithm. Table 6.5.I correlates the transient
model parameter variables with the SAFD parameter variables.
6.5.1 CLOSED-LOOP LEAKAGE SIMULATION
An artificial 5 Ib/sec leakage of liquid oxidizer (LOX) was introduced
downstream of the HPOTP preburner boost pump as a simulation of a FMEA
external rupture (mentioned In the previous section). A non-zero start
model run at I04_ power level was made with a start time of 29 seconds. The
leakage (failure) was initiated at 30 seconds, resulting in anomalous
behavior of many parameters. The SAFD algorithm signalled a shutdown during
the first two-second interval, by Approach 1 at 30.I0 seconds. Seven
parameters registered exceedence of the safety band, thus signalling the
cutoff.
These parameters include the HPOTP discharge pressure, the HPOTP boost pump
discharge pressure, the main combustion chamber pressure, the HPOT discharge
temperatures l and 2, the LPOTP pump discharge pressure, and the HPFTP
discharge pressure. The results of the transient failure detection
simulation are presented in the plots of Figures 14A - 14I. Each plot
displays four stgnals which represent the parameter simulated signal, the
signal average, the signal Approach 1 upper limit, and the signal Approach 1
lower limit.
Parameter Oesc rlpti on Fiqure
HPOTP Discharge Pressure 14A
HPOTP Boost Pump Discharge Pressure 14B
Main Combustion Chamber Pressure 14C
HPFT Discharge Temperature 2 14D
HPOT Discharge Temperature 2 14E
LPOP Discharge Pressure 14F
HPFTP Discharge Pressure 14G
HPFTP Coolant Liner Pressure 14H
FPOV Actuator Position 141
6.5.2 CLOSED LOOP BLOCKAGE SIMULATION
A failure was simulated which involved increasing the resistance (by a
factor of two) of the duct between the HPFT and the main injector as a
simulation of a FMEA HPFT discharge flow blockage (mentioned in the previous
section). A non-zero start transient model run at I04% power level was
made, with a start time of 29. seconds. The failure was implemented three
seconds later at 32. seconds, resulting in rapidly occurring anomalies in
many of the parameters.
The SAFD algorithm signalled a shutdown with Approach 2 at 32.06 seconds due
to detected anomalies in five parameters. Recall that Approach 1 is in
operation during the first two seconds of the algorithm operation, while
Approach 2 is tn operation thereafter. The five parameters include the HPFT
discharge temperatures, the HPFTP discharge pressure, the FPOV actuator
position, the HPFTP coolant liner pressure, and the fuel flowmeter. The
results of the transient-failure detection simulation are presented in the
plots of Figures 15A - lSI. Each plot displays four signals whtch represent
the parameter simulated signal, the signal average, the signal Approach 2
upper limit, and the signal Approach 2 lower limit. The plots indicate
clearly the engine steady-state behavior followed by anomalous behavior as a
result of the blockage, and the subsequent recovery to steady-state due to
the engine controller's command of the FPOV and OPOV actuator positions.
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The SAFD algorithm detected an anomaly in the HPFT discharge temperature
slgnal far earlier than the potentlal tlme of the redllne temperature of
Ig60°R.
Parameter Oescr4 otl on
Main Combustion Chamber Pressure 15A
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Discharge Pressure 15B
Hlgh Pressure Fuel Turbopump Coolant Liner Pressure 15C
High Pressure Fuel Turbine Discharge Temp 1 15D
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine Discharge Temp I ISE
High Pressure Fuel Pump Speed ISF
Low Pressure Fuel Pump Speed 15G
Fuel Flowmeter 15H
FPOV Actuator Position 151
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6.6 LESSONS LEARNED
During the course of the present contract, several features of the SSME were
Investigated fn detail and information, useful for future failure detection
algorithm development, was analyzed and recorded. Thus, transient effects
other than the start and power transients, were found to significantly
influence parameter values. If these effects are not compensated for, the
failure detection algorithm wlll lose some of its sensitivity to failures
and thus be more sluggish. Two of these effects are due to the
repressurlzation and venting (of fuel and oxidizer) that are carried out
during SSME ground tests to simulate actual flight conditions on the engine.
These effects are apparent in over half of the 24 SAFD monitored
parameters. Some of the effects of GOX and fuel repressurlzatlon valve
closure are presented In Figure 16 and the effect of
venttng/repressurlzatton are shown in Figure 17. Moreover, nonlinear
behavior of several SSME parameters, that is inherent to engine
characteristics, were also identified. These effects were termed nonlinear
because of the characteristic shape that each parameter takes tn ttme even
tn the absence of any ventlng/repressurtzatton or other transient
phenomena. Thus, it takes over 75 seconds for the HPOT turbine discharge
temperature, the NCC liner cavity pressure, and the HPOT seal cavity
pressure to reach steady-state. While the HPOP intermediate seal purge
pressure ts totally nonlinear (see Figures 18A,B,C,D,E). If these
parameters are to be monitored,then it is necessary to develop estimates of
their normal mean values that are ptecewtse linear or that are represented
by predetermined curves that are close to the real parameter value such that
the bandwidth placed around such altne can be made less restrictive. For,
tf the average (mean value) ltne can be closely represented then the safety
band around tt can be made smaller and thus provide an increased sensitivity
to the algorithm.
In order to evaluate the possibility of a predetermined plecewlse linear
mean value profile for the parameters that are effected by the
repressurlzatlon and venting procedures, the planned versus accomplished
profile of the engine LOX inlet net positive suction pressure (NPSP) were
studied. It was found that the planned proflle Is very closely traced by
the achieved profile (see Figure ]g), Hence, it is possible to determine a
piecewlse linear average for the effected SAFD parameters by using a
predetermined NPSP profile in combination with existing computational
routines that calculate the "influence coefficients M that reflect the
effects of a given degree of repressurlzation/ventlng on a given engine
parameter. In this manner, the new plecewlse llnear average profiles for
these parameters will be close representations of their actual values. Thls
wlll lead to a more sensitive algorithm and thus catch failures in the early
stages,
These and other work can be carried out to enhance the SAFD performance and
expand its scope significantly.
,__j
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7. CONCLUSION
Extensive computer simulations with the SAFD algorithm on real SSME incident
test data indicate significantly earlier cutoffs than achieved with the
existing redline system. Cutoffs were found to be a function of the kind of
failure that occurred, the speed wlth which it progressed and the location
and degree of localization of the anomalies. Thus, in fast occurring
failures, such as ruptures or breakage of structural areas, the SAFD showed
only a slight gain over the redltnes. While for slow occurring failures the
SAFD algorithm showed significantly earlier shutdown capability.
The performance of the SAFD algorithm depends heavily on the choice of the
weighting factor N that determines the bandwidth of the safety limits placed
around the average value of each signal for monitoring purposes. Moreover,
the added safety feature that the algorithm has is the requirement for
mu]ttple anomalous signals for an engtne cutoff command. Thus, three, four,
five, six or more signals exceeding the safety limits simultaneously leads
to a cutoff command. This number should be predetermined for each signal
prior to each test. Hence, two factors are important in the decision for
engine cutoff. Namely, the weighting factor N and the number of anomalous
parameters signalling failures simultaneously. There is no procedure for
the selection of these factors other than experience and trial and error
presently. However, work has been performed on finding ways of
automatically determining these numbers at the start of the algorithm during
a test.
The SAFD, as it currently stands, can only handle steady-state test
operating conditions and it is turned off during the start transient, as
well as during power transients. However, the first instant check that the
algorithm is equipped with (that checks the value of each of the first
incoming measurement signals agatnst a precomputed nominal expected value)
is for detection of anomalous behavior that might have occurred during a
transient. This feature provides some degree of fault detection capability
at start or power transients. Moreover, the option of expanding the
capability to handle transients, as well as other nonlinear and excursion
effects are under consideration and plans for such augmentation exist. The
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algorithm monitors more parameters than the redlines, with the option of
expanding the list even further. Also, the SAFD avoids "false alarms' by
the above mentioned requirement of the anomalous behavior of several
parameters prlor to a declslon for englne shutdown.
There are transient effects that effect several engine parameters due to
repressurization and venting, as well as to BOX/fuel repressurization valve
closures. These effects are presently compensated for by increasing the
safety bandwidth to cover parameter excursions due to such transients, thus
reducing the sensitivity of the algorithm to actual failures. However,
plans to accommodate such behavior have been worked upon and can be
implemented In follow-on work. Also lacking is sensor failure detection
(except for negative readings). These and other limitations of the SAFD can
be worked on and its effectiveness and scope can be enhanced given
appropriate planning, analyses, simulations, and judicious approaches.
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So RECOMMENDATIONS
By all means, it is highly desirable to develop a failure detection
algorlthm for the SSME that can operate under all conditions (steady-state
and transient) and that is sensitive enough to detect slow and fast failures
at such an early stage that damage to the englne is minimized, There are
certain approaches that, if taken, can lead to the above mentioned enhanced
and expanded algorithm. In this section a few tasks are outlined that wlll
accomplish some of the enhancements.
8.1 FAILURE DETECTION
,'-,
.2-
The fault detection problem involves a thorough and realistic understanding
and specification of the given system. The various failure modes that may
occur can be described as either fast occurring and progressing or as
incipient (slow developing) faults. Fault detection is approached either
via model-based or signal-based techniques. For analytical redundancy
purposes some kind of validation of nominal relationships of the given
system, using the actual input and the measured output, are carried out and
the dynamics of the system are evaluated on-line in a real-time manner
(Figure 20).
Most advanced fault detection schemes suffer from complexity and often from
inherent weakness in reliability. However, it Is usually possible to
develop simple fault detection schemes that do not require extensive
analytical development and that work reliably and efficiently. Such an
approach involves the use of the SSME OTM.
Analytical redundancy, especially when applied to key engine parameters, can
provide significant reliability and enhanced performance, especially under
sensor failures. A good analytical model of the engine is required that can
predict the expected outputs very closely (to that of the actual values) and
thus provide analytical values to compare actual outputs with and make a
decision regarding the status of the sensor. The SSME DTM is a very
effective tool that can be utilized (perhaps piecewise llnearization will be
required in order to make it real-time on-line applicable) for such
analytical redundancy purposes. There are many key sensors that need such
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redundancy and that when implemented can enhance engine performance, avoid
engine shutdowns due to false alarms, and that can minimize damage from
failures.
8.2 SENSOR FAILURE DETECTION
Throughout the history of the Space Shuttle program, the only SSME In-fllght
shutdown occurred durlng flight 51F July 30, Ig85, due to the malfunction of
the HPFT discharge temperature sensors. This type of failure can be easily
avoided glven a good (slmple) sensor fallure detection approach.
such an approach was evaluated uslng the information from past engine data
as well as slmulatlons vta the SSME DTM. It ts clearly indicated in the
sensor outputs from fltght 51F (see Figure 21) that the only parameters that
showed anomalous behavlor were the two HPFT discharge temperature sensors,
while all the other parameters were nominal. Thts ts sufficient cause to
believe that It Is a sensor failure. Moreover, computer simulations by the
OTM of the same sensor output (as was shown tn Figure 21) was arttflcally
induced and the effects on other parameters were plotted. Figure 22 shows
the dramatlc influence of a sudden temperature rtse of the HPFT discharge
flow on several other parameters. Since no such effects were recorded
during flight 51F the _fatlure' was a false alarm. Similar Indications are
shown tn Figure 23. Herein, a change tn any one of the parameters shown,
results tn a corresponding change tn each of the other sensor outputs.
Thus, sensor outputs can be correlated tn such a manner as to generate
useful lnformtton regarding the status of sensors.
The Implementation of such a scheme Is straight fo_ard, does not require
extensive computational effort and can significantly enhance the performance
of the SAFO algorithm.
8.3 SAFD PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENTS
In accordance with the observations made in the previous pages, it is highly
recommended that work be continued on the SAFD algorithm development and
enhancements directed towards expanding the capabilities of the algorithm.
These expansions should address SAF0 operation during start and power
transients, accommodations and compensations for nonlinear effects and
transient effects due to fuel/oxidizer repressurlzation/venting and fuel/GOX
repressurization valve closures. In addition, sensor failure detection
schemes should be simulated that are simple and easy to implement in order
to study their feasibility and effectiveness.
The capabllity exists at Rocketdyne to evaluate the SSME from a systems
point of view and develop failure detection schemes based on practical
implementation and feasibility issues and formulated on sound mathematical
and advanced fault detection knowledge. Advanced observer-based estimation
routines can be utilized, using the OTM, that can provide analytical
redundancy and enhanced failure detection capability. Various options have
already been studied and their feaslbility has been evaluated.
This useful effort should continue without the slow-down of unnecessary
contractual breaks in order to have the engineers devote their full
attention to the important task of SSME failure detection.
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TOTAL O4GIN_S - ! TOTAL RUNS -
PNqNdlLrrEx TITL[ W.AN 8lrsM IrE
MCC JiG INJ _ A 14.2_ -
).IPIrp CLNT LHR A 3416.165001HN) -
MPlrp CLNT iNN 8 3425. 29511000 -
PC NFD 711 ffSlA $185.511ooee
OP_ PC 11_ P_IS $249.$2301_ -
OX INJ F_ 5K PSIS, 37_4.246100
.-_ os,,, ,,,_ .. _ 8,. 223"
ucc pc A m_ (VCPA) 3128.9m
PC 00 AVQ (Id(:_9) 3125.272600
k_C Ct_t DS _MP 8 • ! 7 4890004
HpIrlp SP(_ A 3400M.681_4JO
HpIr_ SPE(D 00 350065. 360060
HPFT 0S TMP B 1?21, 712066
HPOT 0S TiP A 14002,Q62606
,=.O,o.%.. ,400,.405.,3_4 PSIS 81. (_2005.3_
_40 011 IN PR I 286 PSIS 001.1906H
01{ IN Pq 2 2800 PSIS 82. le6000000
LP_ 015040 _ A 334.H2500
LPOP 0ISCt0G P6 0 334.375_
I_1 INY PR 511 I_!_ 3372.._SP_dl_
H_ lIT 7 IJe/100oe J125.721760
VlDIT 0P 2S61_J I 0 124.7000071wi
QPOV ACT POS A (OP_) 01_.303129
rPov ACT POS A (rpv:) 79.S03610
ImOV AC_ POS 8 (RvIII-Z) ?0.552410
uP/rP 01SCHG _ A 2200.4831_01
LPfP 01SI_IG P_t 00 (PI_) 228.3753114
rL IN I_ I 180 PSI 24.145131
O_ rL IN me 2 tee PSI 24. 134;11341
05 _ t4FO 71( _|A 4072.43_
PEP 0S _q NFO 00540 PSI 7490.22701_
Sl_l_ _|I_E VAIIIAII(_ S7UDY (r_2N. ll)l_'L) ILL=216|
Sl_ SL 4,_1
-00,.-.-
1.00Y
i fQrAL $Li_18 -
S. 348088 S. 561806
S. 727688 S- 14430003
4. iH_0062 3.2 178008
00.056855 3.93.54009
8.884245 4. 227324
8.387543 3.00 t6904
3.724154 3.145163
4.1320022 3. 9090023
- 8,661t11- 41. 487292
353,221710 424 .°1Nil
348.47 IMIO 4300. 628800
I .N_482 2.1100576
2,227716 2. 406753
I. 642775 1.00009636
1.8564145 00.0072684
00.2_ 00. 10074E_
8, S??MI00 00.333402
8.08100002 6.333846
I. 22H38 1.270071_
I. 2004 706 t. 2730030
2. 0505 t g 3.040034|
00.241_2 I. 3418400
00. 080078 t 00.166205
00,115387 00 13721)00
8. H61007 0. 04884 g
00.1008.3.'5J 00.1 340031
6.1_746 6.1300824
00.M2116 00.001248_
00. _4543 00.8007052
00,182487 00.1204184
00, 144548 41. i 1004100
4.118EM 3. 7001716
100. 463231
m f
nl
4800
3008 )
2e, )
200 )
2ee )
20_ )
=
21m
2100
0700
'142
N
N
34t 13,85003M
s,_ro SLIcr TO SLIC[ Sl_ [_IN( VkqiAT_ STUnY (r_N_2t.lO0_U'_) (S_.,AI
TIti( - I18:3624Q GD_STAr _Q_ V(lqS;_ - ,.iX __,
SIC|M SL_l_
_4 ) MCC HG INJ PR A 3358. 155000 7.3t7478 ?.23002"_ 0.e$2158
03 ) HPrP CLNT LNR A 3415.007800_ ?.|00T740 8.001204| 5.0016131|
84 ) f4ef'p ¢LNr LNR 0 .3418. i054NM 8.10_J714t 8.828751 5.4006413
410 ) m_ PC _ 71( _SJA S1400.0025., 0.037400 S.,4S,? 00.73,._*S
4O4)) O'S PC ,ex *S,S 8100_.00°2., ,*.=_X,* 8._,S,_ *.t.,_*
3006 ) ucc ox s_ _ _ _sJS see° 7000m o.N.q.l.1 S._3SZ= S.'_4"_2
451 ) HPlrP DS PR N_D file PS| 0012_.37f_eillI 14.17"8810 7,443711 100.0471,,_t
001 I NCC PC A AV_ (UCPA) 3126.81_nOno 4.811S M 3.S08327 3.nttt6
kCC PC I AV_ (_) 3124. I_S_1_111 8.37_38_ 3.00410012 4._44002
MCC CLN7 _S TMP 0 4_!.007._P_e 1.00318_ 054041040_ 4.-8401000-
2 HPY_ SPt[(D A 350025.200008_ S13.4L5_44J 384.|001_84 350.178004
211 I'iPIrP 5P(_) 8 350018,5204_00 478 44_544 384.515104 347.00011001
:1.11 ) NPF7 D$ IMP A 1818.700211_ 8.5800335 2.847071 2.7tH13
232 ) _ 0S ;LeD 8 1A51 00_,'m 8.886047 |.244_4 3.T_0272
HPOT C_ T1dP A 1357.54_ 3.447558 2.933432 2.831508
234 ) IPOT 08 _ 8 lj800.13Oo40 1.0058313 1.JQtO#7 1.87_3004
_l FAC 3M P_IS 841.545007_) 8..._36.._L3 00.33OO84 00.341002
_G_ _N I_ _ 2500 PS,$ 82.3100730 8.741817 00 27003_J 8.418433
) 12_OX IN,2 2SgP_IS 2 t483 0, , 74,1, ,.2_00374 ,,,2
) _A_ OISC_= 3S7.51,._00 ,.SL'_. ,.2442,3 ,._e_846
,_s2tel _ _sc_'_ 1.422423TO 3S8.4()100041 I. 343244 t. 441857
_lS 3757.026_10 4.168828 3.2t5217 3.2_4_152
_} _ 1N7 T 1500/I_ 883.45qTP, e 8.2311_I 4._7668 00.40070_5
00 1171141152_IPSI0 l_e. 714664; 00 _7234
0POV ACTHX VOIl 0Ppo_ A • 00 043197140 (G_V2) 007.35675'00 00.1=77_ e 12_38 e 00_50021
141 ) OPOV A¢7 POS 8 (RV_I-I} 87.40071q41 8.18_481 00.115357 0.0038474
142 ) {1_ ACT POS A (rl_r_) 700.70054008 00 131107 00.120818 00.12001008
143 ) _ ACT _ 8 (N_D_-2) 70 700!1841_ 00.100746 1.1261005 00,130415
213 ) LPrP OIS_G Pff A 2400.700184N_ 1._15174 1.481884' 1.3434300
8821_ I LPFP OISCHG _ 00 (Pl°) |46. 932800 1 • 02097 1.3808. 1.29,3800F,_ rL IN I_ 111 PSi 7.._615401 I).142897 6.20001|7 00.221785) _ rl I_l PAP IN PSI 7.$_4253 6.144422 8.2110041 00.225106
334 ) HP_P DS PN NFD 71( qJA 4855.174_Hle 6,74,1131 4.00_1521 5.183_L_|
341 ) _I_ 05 _ klf'O 9580 _l ;'226 781_8 152727300 0.043372 00.1580052
( 620028. III_L )
SIG_ SL
0. 4004'_2
5.514937
8.?861200
7.158874
4. 8200337
3.078147
8.221846
3.777332
4.121324
00.N.558|
4IS. 8600208
4119.00N2te
8.71W3002
8.277931
3.8544002
t. 833114
8. 111841'2
00. 3427002
8.M1750
1,008870
I. 0022341
3.126015
O 8200|41
0 002_41
8. 130182
8+ 1250036
0. 158331
8.100716
1.583524
1.8482117
O. 17J9003
4.181328
4,4810032
7,1006711
\
..,._j +
_v" ,+
Io I
4100
284
201
232
233
m
:me
21o
870
142
143
118
Tll[- It : 003211
PMANdLTT[II TITLE
UCC HG INJ _A
1411rP CLNT LNR A
tlDFP CLNT Uat 9
111141PC 141"0 711 PSIA
0MD _¢ IlK PSIS
tCC OX INJ Mq SK ?SIS
kPVP OS Pit NF9 tm PSi
_ A A_ (UCPA)
_C PC O A_; (M_I)
CLNT OS TIP O
14PVP SIICm A
_prp SP_D 0
14wrT DS nPA
Hprr 0S n0010
I.iiDol' os 'nlal A
HPOT 0SllaD9
rAC OX ru o5 PR 350 PSI5
OX [N PR 1 2500 ?SIS
_ IN I1_ 2 258 PS15
UD_ OISC_ PR A
LPQP 01SCHG IIII B
HX IHT PO IK ?SIS
I_ IHT 7 IIO/19Oe
14X _ I:P 251MISIO
OPOV _ m0S A (0ira,'2)
_ACT_
Irpov ACT lOS (WVO0*.2)
LPrP DISC_G Im A
LP_I_ 0tSO5G Jm II (Pie)
rl. IN lql 1 1000 PSI
E)_G TL IN Plq 2 tO0 PSI
HPOP _ Mt MIrO 71( I_IA
OS P_ Nr0 85041, _+'
TABLE 6.1.2 (cont.) _ /)-D-,g_-
.,.,..
- I YOYA£. _ - ! 7OT&l..SI.JC5_
_ _ _Yr_ ,,n-_yr_ - /t _/_+_.- 4+"
3345.114141411 7. 4231?_ 7.413122 7. 48440000
34 200. 0080000 7.••3177 5.7101100 5.57?443
3425. INHI5Hle 4.1124998 4.713237 4. ?88491
5Oil. 14 t044 4.2264148 4.00,_542 5.012113
S I M. 8280041 1. H3844 I. 34107 7. leSS 17
34148 338081 7.5'42997 5 388135 O 388183
1131. 523038 ?+ $15 ! 40 ?. _5238_ 9 774713
3134.2171HHJ 4.585581 4. 038527 4. 850818
3118. 2840001 3.9111117 3.4411)541 3.427774
4000. 85584_ i.12481i 1 .IN)81100 41.117912
351800. 4011'14141 4.84. 231744 475.1112N 4?4,7371141
35152. ?2H 4811.1520o4 403. NS2N 447.121 |ee
1157+ 457000 3.2M 183 4.4481441 2.003884
1595.3751N ,_. 751eel 4.8441943 3.2231123
1343. o7ooee 2. N5?H 2. ? 11217 3.118317
1348.8851)41)0 t • 814225 2.655744 2.767797
81.39417900 00.2875341 00.414084 O. 3600400
82. 2510100 41,4355_ O .543871 O. 477128
82. 4832711 1. 4411548 5. _5 4._.x00 00. 4822500
3441. HI 1141 I. 18411P8 f. 110158 1.2414002
341.148314J 1. 0040548 1.175853 I. 302217
350o. ??OiNle 3.142130 2.152331 2.7571841
875. 298 lee 00.112974 I. _$441 0. 335?34
12.12007500 0.0035935 e. 0?'7573 00.14 00379
18.5164100 O. 135318 O. 131451 8 1300815
68.067960 i. 174135 O IHHJ2?i O, 189181
611.549995 il. 13531#+ O. 148153 00.1311623
811.0189441 00. t 002738 O. t 44232 00.138323
224. 836400 •. 9J4334 I. 011341 o. 9470081
225. M7888 0.810920 0.385797 00.937520
24. 340248 8+ 069152 0.130207 0.116182
24. 2899500 8.0075478 8.1384 ! 0 0.12283 I
4138. 7110000 4. 595365 S .3972511 5.748280
"#'215. 7003800 100,227958 1 t. 713811'1 11. 750710
SAF10 SLICE TO SLICE SlOM_ BCINE V,tJIIATION STUOY (r.2te00) [81.21041-4]
Till - .:511:11 GE'N$TAT IqI_GRAkl V[RSICN - 1,00X L_CL_._ ) -+'OTA+._Z_-S - I TOr,_L_r+s - ( TOT'.*LS 1.41
• 10 ! PARA_T_ TITLE kF._N SlCIM SL _ SIGI_ _L
{ 24 1 _C¢, ,PlJ. A 33, ,4,, _ ? 883885OPJG!N_L PAGE IS 5, .,,- _.. ,,, • 34.9,ee. 5:...8 5..54454 ) HP+Irp CLN? I,.NR O 3421.515044 6.1500129 5.428203
QUAL!'r( _ 4,00 1 "" PC '_pOOR ,. c,_ pc s=25.3005,ee ? 389_? 1.9,5704+_ 4928. 6520,041 8. 4111238 6. 283927
( 305 k_C C_ IMJ PII 3691.2710H 7.2529412 5.4039414
( 459 ) HPrP 0S P_ Nf_ 8103.51211_e 8.120118 i.787115
( 2941 I MCC _1_ A A_ (MCPA) 3128 . 757500 4.4941_ 3.113051( 201 _ PC: B ArC: (MCPE) 3125.3250441 5.044401 3.819527
I _ ) _ CI.N_ OS 11_ O 440.7500011 O._NNNNNI 8.8'1_N)_)) _F TM _(_ A ,_120.1161_i 124.15•2941 210. 1388941
( 211 ) HPI_ _deF.J_ II 35132.2889418 131.241844 212.0825941
( 231 ) HPf'T 0S ?UP A 1173.8259411 2.111520 2.38477?
( 252 ) tPTT DS TILP 0 1141.438040 3.10171? 2.505591
( 233 ) HPOT DS _ A 93.%. _._ J.51i'3?JJ 3.247431
I 234 ) HnOT DS 'r_ I 1432.2858H 2.120121 2.25470385 ¢_ 0_ IrU O0 lqq 81 +00_4950 00.394_ 2 0 3235415
854 ) DIG O_ IN PR 1 51.417380 0.458172 1.288527
I _ I EIC 0_ 10 lql. 11.317510 0.4777?3 0.:P11305LPOP OISCF, G I_R A 3400.5586841 1.2215400 1,13H24
( 2tll ) _ 017_]4_ lql n 341._4_40 1.1884141 1.116189
I 57a ) .x ,,T_ _58 _3850 3.o_4152 3.oo2o_
8?00 ) HX IN? 9414, 11804141 1.215851 1.41_
ML3 ) HX VO5T OF' 125.32?444 00 135427 O 11)2551
1441 ) 0POV _T P_ A (OPV2) IL'_.24002100 Ot1021M 0.|_.$712
1 141 I QItOV ACT PO$ O (RV_-t) 004.80057941 41.131371 0.054484142 IPPOV ACT _ A (FPV2) _1.8811904 8.14427t 0.118145
143 I FT_OV ACT P_$ O (_2) ')_.1831500 00,155101 1.127013
I 203 LPlm 015C3_ J_ A 257.0077844 I.•58218 1.00374941
204 I Lplrp DISCHG PII O (P10) 257.8123ee 1.110717 1.e0170
1_1 (NO Ft. IN MR 1 2';.139040 00.10753 0.1382_S
_: I _G FL I, PR 2 24.9479, 9.152024 0.155143
; t5q_ 0S PO Ni_ 4073.831NNle 5.94131NL5 S.7301:_1
, 341 ) PlP OS PR NFO 74941.121oee 13.4134,441 11.5413411)
TOI
54
• 315
4S8
_O
2941
231
232
=
2_0
8711
14e
t41
142
204
810
_L!4
341
7.315481
5. 0805700
4.571054
4.754971
8.83M44
11.740214
7.4121114
4. 127152
3.1714111
0.14115551
5413.1997N
404,1145414
2.943817
3. 40005932
2,944q32
t. 0t555d
00. 357456
00 384844
00.513072
1. 254535
1. 1118528
2.859332
1. 185124
00.141 Ill
00. 133391
t. 853853
00.1372o0
1.1164141
O. 877708
00.878274
00.118949
00. 12531)4
4. TS1735
I¢1.811411
/_"_ .+./S't
SIVA SL
758_37
5.1600115
5. 9470069
3.855701
?, 9654941
5. 512891
7.185141
4. 111418
3.981438
85 ee0eee
215. se00100
215.8132o4
2. ?47358
2.38?879
J. 207879
2. 7550,111
0.321345
5.332+,48
e, 333433
1. Idm?$3
0.981424
3.749718
I. 457313
0,138211
00, 1341415
I-H1117
00 123113
00. 135215
I. 878950
I. e088411
l. 1100552
O. 173299
00.375 IS,5
13. 203720
SAFO SLICE TO SLICE Sl_ (NOIN[ VAIIIATION 511N_ TI ,_,"n.*_+'_s ) )RL2028]
7_1_ - 941; I0 : I0 _JU_TAT J_IJO(_LA_ VI_Q_|I_ -- 1,0Y
TOTAL I_011_5 - I |OTAL _ I ll;IAl :;11q*'I_S -- 1941 "_J
(82027.1845P1.1 5p_w,rr_ 7_T,, _t*. s,m_ _z s_a_ s_ s_ st.
ICC 140 INJ lql A 3313.8,q54_0 - "7.2311272 5.31002100
P.JJ4T _ A 3435.4450_1) - S.345111_ 1.541122
H_rP CLNf LNR O 3441.1551_ - 5.427_1 5+574311
FI_ PC NFO "/1( PSIA 517t, TIPN - 5.150511 4.311119
QP_ PC 181( PS|S 51|3.8794_ - |.438751 4.8100181
0X lllJ _ _I( P_IS 3138.81400OQ -- O.001i1_77 4._ml32
HPtPP OS PR _ O_ PSI 8210. t0504141 - IO.13251o 7.128548
PC A Abe; (14_A) 3128.51501NI -- 3.13_r_02 3.75_
M_C PC O AM; (MCP) 3125.30_40 - 3.271784 2.713317
M_ CU/T' O_ _ O 4003.5_4q41_ - O Je_llO 1._1735
SPEED • 353001.7_1oe - 3511.257100 34,1.5084941
I,Mlqt sP(rI'J O 35358.528/Me - 331.814700 340.550500
HP_T 0S TIP A 1842.662_00 - 5.734157 3.343284
HPrT DS Tl_ II I0_?.38201N) - 4,_'Jli_ 2.210325
O_ _ A 1215.4|20'At - 1.1413941 I._11400004
HPOT 0_ _ O 1242. |45_1H) -- 1.401220 ! .3e_0S
TAC OX rU 05 _t 350 _SlS _ - 0.317121 0.2H724
_NG OX IN P_ 1 _ PS15 82 0117_1 - 1 MI47_ O 401407
OX IN PR 2 251 _SIS 82.538310 - 1.5007131 0.41f842
LPOP OISCHG PR A 330.t0P301_ - 1,541131 1.144142
01_34G PM II 338.4143_ - 1.410582 1.014277
HX INY Iql 5(< |1_1.1; 3741.8741wqHPl -- 2..3715941 1,45733•
H_ INT T III0/Itel 822.70471_ - 0.4004:HI1 0.383411
HX VO4T _P 250PSIO 80.7274941 - 0.041253 00.125110
ACT _OS A (Ol_r_) 84.184038 -- 00.1110400 00.1200,'_Ai3
O_Ov ACT PO$ O (RM01-I) 13711171 - 00.0078047 , 014333
FIeOV ACT POS A (F'PV2) 75.536711 - 1. 131511 0. 137_1|
FPOV ACT PO_ 8 (RVO_-2) 78.7381400 - 9. 140144 0.147371
LPIrP OlSOC PW A 231.7784ee 1 185735 1.257410
LPrP OISCHG MI II (P!11) 231.521380 1.14NI547 I. 110312
I[IC IrL IN PR 1 t941 PSI 6.249372 O. 1941M4 O. 154331
ENG FL IN _q_ 2 18¢) PSI |,3175_1 8.183014 11.181114
HP_ • 0S R NFO ?K PSIA 402|.4238 5.317_3_ 4.210002
P_ OS PR Mro 00509 PSI 7221.527041 |.|MI07 5.088748
_V_6
Io I
1
!:1
13
14
15
td
17
10
16
N
25
24
,i 2
PNU_a('TI_ TITLE
_IWTOTAP
0_nY'TOl"BP
HI_rlrOTBA
0N_rTDTA
DHMrl"OT8
)IIOTOYAP
NPQTDrAA
HPOTOI1P
MeOTOI'IIA
0HPOTOTA
0iSP'OTOTII
UP'0PSP_
_A
HPCI_PA
LP_'PSP_
t_rPSPA
NPrPS_
_rP_A
0LF_WSP
0HPCPSP
DLPFIISP
OHPrPSP
0POV_M
0POVA
FP0VI_
FlmOVA
DCY_V
OFPOV
TABLE n=6=._:2A (cont.)
_¥A _ _ _ S'I'_ _ 11) ••:_•41S
(IITH ON( _ C_)
aO8'lrAT _ _q_SIQN - 81Q
, ,ORAL ,
1_74.18_H_ 44. _1 _l 1852. S_NH_ 3.5._._4
19O5 Jtt_ W, 44¢1_N t 178.8484_ e.INNHHM
1?40. NONe 40. SSUN ! ?3_P.544040 | ?. 1,77071
1780.187qHM) 52.M1_8_ 1742. _ 18.84_M
42. S_MN_ 28.41_5_ 22. _HNH_ 3.S36534
34. 104444 _._EIM 18. NO044 T ,8710i4
1344.833m M. 447_70 1327.389O4HI ,1. S.ISS34
1341.447444 41, I0481• 1337._HHI414 17. iTTiT0
1421.00_H_ 841.878400 1417 .M 38. _H_7t
13Jl. 107N 39. $4•86• 1447,.508808 ,31.019810
24. IIIIINI4 32.7"4444 10.O•¢NNIG 14.142140
27. _•_ 22..I•411_ _WII.O01•_41 14. 142 ) 41
5288.332o48 27.3202O8 5220.14144o 14.14214o
qzr t. _!_148h_ _5. #S._4_f 02•O. INNNN_ 14.14214•
283_•. 031H)04 218.44184HI 2O476. IHleeee 11_. o4_oee
28393.331NHII 22E. 421404 28,585.446444 134.354,1814
15849. I J 028.072_ I 01 _4. _HNN_ 20.284270
14022.504400 463.71M44 I 6183.8,1HNHN! 21.2132t0
38270. $64o4wi 76.811qHle 35170 .IHleete 36.3663.30
36263.33_ los, t08244 35 tee. _ 58.56644
16.9O4444 10.044444 20.44888o 8. o9oeee
34.186060 24.579844 34. N4444 28.284270
Ikl. 0004N_ 8S.00SI40 8.14HHHHI 7.071048
44.M 4S. 184_7_ 15. _HHH_ 21.213218
114.833.330 0. 844435 OS..1411144 0.494073
0J. 2_N_ o. 3O11444 85,451HH_ •. 3535.53
oo. 04|•go t. es t002 80. 054o46 o. 0?0715
81.41 IN t. 31•2H 84.349ito O, U6403
8. _NHNI4_ •, 451404 o. ! i_OlHI 0.141421
8.581HNHI O. 361939 O. 480444 6. 424204
P_qf_qk_J4_( PA/_S AV_ VALe/( • S|_ _46 TO O46 11841 PL) HIE]) V_ ACTUAL
0ATA _ AI T(ST STAIWO-TI_3T _HI10488 TO 9014'J, I1 EZ_
WITH _0 PtJ_ C:4'_C r':
TIJ_- $5:26:18
[D _ P_L4M_T_q TITL[
( 3 ) _rTOT_
t 4 ) HPFTOTAA
( il 14'IrToTOA( 0_P_3_TA( 0HPFTOTB
( tl ) HPOTOTNe
( 18 ) HPOTOTAA
12 HI_TOT_
_ 14 _I_TOT|
f I_ L_A
( 17 ) _m_SP_
( 16 ) _PA
( to )
( -_e ) b-r_,
22 I _
23 0v.P_P
0LP_P
( 2o ) o0er_P
_A
I 31132 ) OF_OV
(
(
_STAT_ vmsw- .o
TOTAL I_G|,I[S - _ TOTAL SUNS - I _ TOTAL •Lien - 12
1652.1_3m 34. ,_417_0 18_. 51100418 -_-53"_5q4
I_SS. _3M 35. 021648 1841. 580400 31.019810
1803. 751H188 48. 344,518 1044.0/HN_Ji 0.8•eeee
; 1086.033080 40,4426_J 1880.000008 28. 204270
16. $83338 13,3|2_i_ 20. oeee4HI 14.14214•
17.91666| 14.841_0 28. e•e84NI 8. eeeeo4
1369. $830_J 12.174910 1416.0g4HH_ 03,639440
1302. S0eOO4 63. 478700 1444,84HHH_ 28.284270
1433.333844 64,03444g 1448.4404HI0 43. dL30•g•
1437 J83000 44.961910 1442.5_ 31.019810
7.JH_ 7.284871 44. _ 2P. 2_3218
17. IHL,3336 10.14447• 67.544800 31.81t818
S224.104ON 13.718544 5228.M 21.213210
5224.10aM 15._3_720 5210.1144H18_ 21,21321•
20443.334HNNI _87,112._HI 2|788. IH_,ICNII 141. 42141_
28442.59O44HI 382.44121HI 2834&. 11444NNI $76.8271_HI
15842.610044 _3.68_1_ 151HIS. IHN_44 77.761754
I _52.0184H_ 47,742_ I_J45.0OO04_ 144.4924OO
3.5403.33OO4O 344.07439O 3531 •.44•4me 1SS. S63644
3.5390. eo4e_i 3_dl. S.55200 3S216. N444HI 40.407480
4,1 4488o 4. _7184 3_. M 14.142140
_7.51HHHI• 31.102116 118. INNIGCHI 04. BS2111e
34.833338 38.964138 I0_.iCHHH_ |4.862810
20. e1_448 23.444.144 05.NHI9O0 IN.H60•0
47.5833M I. 81_I.I irT. 5NN0 41.70Ytl7
47.841880 •. 107887 07.4400ml O. 414268
_.75_ . 1._3 76.5_4_t 2. 121321
70.83333• 1. IL14_711 /11.7SOON I. 7177i7
0.141i87 8.3J0834 6, .3aOOd_ 0. 282043
O. _ e. S70437 2.76_4NI 8.353053
TI_ - 11:14:84
10 dF P_qAUL'TER TIT Ir
3 ) NPIrl'oT._
4 ) NPr_TaJ_
S ) IfrtOTlP
0 ) ItWr_T_
7 ) 0_rTOTA
0 ) 0HprTOTO
O ) _HPQTOTAP
ve ) _l'or,J_
II i _OTO_P
12 _OTDnlA
13 0HlU0TOTA
14 _ p0eO_OTB
I$ I" _A
I1 ! _A19 _26 Uq_tsp,t
21 ) 14PrPSPP_
22 ), t4pIrl_
24)
26) OLP_w_P
21 ) 0t4prPSp
2S ) (rPovPn
3o ) ; FPOVA
_2 _ Drpo_
IdF.AN
1473.125OO4
1871i. 2644_
1784.375O4O
1744.878044
11.875118
18.1WHHHNI
1:140. NH_••
1368.875444
1446.82om
1421.2sHe•
18.876m
24.37soee
6216. 02540•
S217. St0000
28538. 25841OO
28648,4444HM
8202.504HI44
18213. 781NNNJ
3,5278.2SHe•
352|3. 780444
1.8?SCHHI
44. 250004
10.2644•41
17.5044H_
L5.759OO0
15. 782544
81.082608
g•.712480
e. 337600
0. 54488•
Pk_ldS AK VALU[ | 51GIM _ TO _NG (1N4C _.) Rq_D VS aCTUAL
(_4GIN( TO _1_11_ P_rrqCTIQNS)
GOG"TAT P_Gn_V w_NSION - NO
TOTAL O40|14_ - S TOTAL IIqJNS . 5 TOTAL SLICI_S - S
1744.M M./4t51N
1752.44_ 45. _1_18
1772.449O9O 441.OOS_IM
I_tl.O_OM 38.9O5110
20.444446 38. 714
31,80444NI 28.71_0 ! 1H_
t3_8.9ON9O U,78229O
1441.444444 _3•. 211411_
1384. IICHHN_ I!. 073734)
|421, _ I 1,1.8_8'2_M'
N. 9O449O 63.184428
97. _ 82,848|M
$252.•_HWI4 27.748471)
821_. _ 11. i?007i
.00009O 328.4_3544
28720. ileeeee 321.3204N
18590. INNNNle 54/I. 186684
18118.0004HI_ 362.681444
_og, O_ 114.117_WJ
38244.8eee4N) . _•o. 944044
84L INI414MJ_ S8. 749488
458,840044 382.284444
548, _O_04_ 2_4.142844
244.44444_ 233.0189O4
60.284440 I ,J43187
71 . 56_1_11 2.182174
04 .INHHHN| 1 O q _
84.21HNNNI 2.118602
57 T'_.'_._ ,.2842,,
 R|G. N LPAG£ IS
CF POC_R _U_L!TY
19.620230
22.1o6130
22.19o71o
22.19O32O
lO.668550
5._48224
39.551O441
4_.N208O
43.732130
10.4495_
20,7773•ql
18.0153"71
17.728NN_
183.9o6288
_89.714144
$8.97942o
45.233080
184.73|114
lol.631444
3.7_8116
33._74•
11.877358
18,322080
0,963624
0,$4H|314
1,425220
1,536839
0,344152
0,366458
.. TABLE 6.1.3
PRELIMINARY CHOICE OF TESTS :nR SAFD SIMULATIONS
TEST #
901-173
901-225
901-285
901-340
901-364
750-285
901-485
750-259
750-175
902-471
--._._902-428
901-307
902-249
901-436
901-136
904-044
SF6-O]
REASON FOR CHOICE
RE-RUN OF TESTS FROM SAFD PHASE 2
RE-RUN OF TESTS FROM SAFD PHASE 2
RE-RUN OF TESTS FROM SAFD PHASE 2
RE-RUN OF TESTS FROM SAFD PHASE 2
RE-RUN OF TESTS FROM SAFD PHASE 2
ONLY FEEDLINE FAILURE
ONLY NOZZLE TUBE FAILURE
ONLY MCC NECK FAILURE
OXIDIZER DUCT FAILURE
FUEL DUCT FAILURE
OPB INJECTOR FAILURE
FPB INJECTOR FAILURE
TURBINE BLADE FAILURE (HPFTP)
COOLANT LINER BUCKLE (HPFTP)
BEARING FAILURE (HPOTP)
BEARING FAILURE (HPOTP)
MAIN FUEL VALVE FAILURE
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TABLE 6.1.9
L0X Venting Effects on Engine Parameters
_t
:+
1.
Sk_ SLICE TO SLICJ r 51Gt_ YMIATION STUDY (F.2204. ie4ZPL) [SL4?BST]
TIM( - 1|:25:1|
fO if PAJtAdL'TE_ TITL[
48e _ Pc 11,( _T5
335 _ ox INa _ SK PSlS451 ) ).Prp OS J_ _ +5N, PS!
( 2ee ) _ PC A AVG (uC_-)
I 2ti UCC PC 8 A_ (UC_)18 MCC CLNT DS 114P B
i 2S01 HPIrP SP(IE3) A261 HPrP P£_D B
231 HPPT OS TMP A
-21 .+--,+.
233 _T _ T_ A
I 234 H_0T OS T2M 8154 FAC OX ru os _ 354 PSlS
( 850 _4G OX IN P_ 1 250 P_I$
( 859 ) ENG OX IN PR 2 240 PSI ¢
8711 I _ l_T TPA 5_ PSIS19 Ille/t9414|NT
+,.+t31 " "+ TM ,'2.ps,o
140 _ ACl r Pos A (_°Y21
( 141 0POV ACT _S (_VOO-I)
I 142 _ ACT POS (F_21t4.3 Irpov ACT PO$ n (RYOB-2)
( 2O3 LP_'P 0|SC_ ,A
LPIrp DISCHG PR 0 (PI8)
( 821 ) 1[]'40 FL IN _qt I foe PSi
I 819 D4G rL IN _ 2 lee PSi
334 HP0P 91 P_q HYO _( PSIA
341 ) POP 0S F_ NFO isee PSi
T[ST 9_2_479, 12e.-I_lS(c
G_'NSTAT PROOR_MV(RSIOH - I.EYo
_OTAL _4G|H[S - I TOTAL RUNS - I TOTAL SLIC_ - 2544
S|_A SL _.j170-22t S_C SlG_k SL
3,3M.530o_e_/o _9_ VE_?7.4242. 338|"_'_"_ _C'f'b_"7.832B64
341$.47_ 4.122985 34|9._I134NNI 4.281880
34_0.99304_ 5.847053 3422.87204141 S.686497
$220+430004 8.543354 5199.328iNI4 7+123|61
5199JSe_ 8.9S3334 5205+344iM_ 8.41B725
3689.438000 5.114195 3688.15414410 5.594066
623_.496800 8,41097g 6242.44S004 8+gST413
3129.450000 3+794997 3129.479004 410417|33
3;23.417_ 4._|8818 3|22.822000 4.t36481
41_.369600 0.129922 411.38840g e.25892g
33671.4600_0 162,2742oe 35719.340o40 190.672200
35472.38oeee lo4.865500 $_71|.,14N 193.844480
1743.88504_ 3.028531 1734.30o800 2.909910
|713.3420oe 2.358172 1711.759004 2.243026
1213,2B2BeB 4.29411)58 1221.4494100 10.77358_
1225.8011_ 3.$37029 123_.9_8000 0.369440
81.1289541 1.114574 13.9740341 0+41|678
81+70987i e.|7|293 BS+II6530 9.30188!
$I.$94150 0.394404 60.9T5871 9.2?32?8
355+92_400 1.02B33! 331,221294 13+134741
35_.$33300 1.056745 331.847904 13.10H40
33gl.0940eg 4.1711388 3,305.40211041 4.1S28S7
798.222200 0.|24097 $01.5_1_14 2+424_Ie
120.7954811 0.425836 122.444400 0+153301
84.78298_ 1.2J2270 47.734834 4.3E53|8
84.152t_1 0+1882_3 67.159650 0.373177
84.746440 0,151254 84..721650 1.144692
84._8140 0.175358 84.31538I I+1?ese_
242.293100 4.1391_4 238.324400 2.776896
242.3?56441 t. 16644'8 238.413701 2.84238S
23.446911 1.117962 2I.ISS4S?O 1.636232
23.474410 0.173640 21.084610 1.636754
404|.|16_ S.$11143 4_45.$_2_ _.814_4g
7201,641_ 12+0o7160 7204.44g000 13.231340
T|U[ - 18:1_:28
ID i PJk£t4i_Tlm' TITL r
_ I IICCH_ |N,/PI_A
_P CLNT _ A
S4 ) HPFP CLNT LMR I
411) ) F'Pi) PC N_rO 71< PSlA
qse ) o1,19 PC le_ PSI$
3S5 ) UCC O_ ]NJ PR 511 PSIS
459 ) HP_ OS PR _ isee PSI
_t_ f uCCPC A A_G (_C_,)PC 8 AV_ (UCPS)MCCCLNT_ _B
26O ) 14p_rp SPEED A
281 I HPFP SP[ED O231 HPFT 0S Tt_ A
232 ) Hp_rT 0_ TT_ g
233 ) HPOT 0S TI4P A
234 ) HPOT 0S TMP I
_; I F_COX F_DS PRI 3541_315DIG O_ IN _ 25O PSIS
-,) _|._.2 =.ps,$
2ttl ) LP_ 0I$C_ Ptt A
210 I LP0P 01$CHG Pl_ BSK878 h0( IN? PR PSIS
O?g ) _ INT T IN/IMHI
883 ) _ vO4Y _ 2_k_SlO
14. ) opov_c,r pOS; _1141 ) OPOv _CT P S (
142 ) _ ACT POS A (Fev2)
1431 ,_ _T ,:,m. <,,,_.-2)203 LPf'P 0ISCHG PR
204 LP_rP 01SCHG H I (PII)
821 ) _ FL IN PR 1 114) PSl
Ill ) _ FL IN PR 2 t_ PSI
334 ) HPOP OS P_ m'0 7K PSI_
341 ) _ OS PR NF'0 1500 PSl
_0 SLIC( TO $L1¢( $1_II_ V_R[kTION STUOY (_2e2_J.le4_PL) [5L44911]
140 L0W VD, IT
"G_TAT FqqOCRAM VI_SION - t.IYb (_011.104500L) [$L46111_
TCTkt EH_IN[S - 1 TOTAL RLNS * 1 TOTAL SLiC[S - :SOd
_,/. _o,. v_-_s_,_ SL _|_ LOWve_
M[AN W.,kN _ SIG_
$414.178008 7.597303
3403._180oe 5.|31771
34|1.|361N_ 1.37|57|
5211.273W 7.113472
S2S9.$sseee I,Se1811
3714._12004 5.404437
$187+7621_ 11.264221
3130.24S_eO 4.$75542
3122.944144)4 4,147_B4
444.8518041 |.6035_
35132.e2ooee 814.516300
3_127.3414140 557.677214
1731+531HHle 8.583497
171E+172000 ll.84211NI
13_7.077_ 7.175731
1404.0644HJ0 2.3_4313
81.307431 1.425118
_1.113104 0.5724145
41.273504 0+57_50
3_5.0S3440 1.637215
354.1i3300 1.67M44
3_107.715100 5.11J732
915.102110 0.707395
80.3_1890 4.183282
71.421331 0.133501
70.$14370 O.Ill327
82.185421 0.183748
81.5117330 1,1t6841
236.403200 2.04?325
231.504100 2.022s51
7.446723 4+219018
?.1844g2 0.223"712
4_J8.4_ 1.482929
7123.2421414 14,242$_MI
3351.7510_1 7.01i,4
.3415.3220OII 7.299684
3421.918000 |.128936
51S.5.13_444 8.188488
51B4.922000 6.574975
3717.699114 5+481334
1171.387040 8.127395
3127,474000 4.049453
3125.3111Nie 3.3041368
47T.030300 0.557341
35341.368000 451+5_0_N
35327.318040 450.I006g0
1848.938_ S.386970
14117.157044 3.964613
1317.M?ee_ 4.393735
1333.5354oe 3.68803S
51.57713_ 1.8414575
51189470 1+8_0271
52.421144 1.8S44N_?
314.2319q)e 3.4_44_J
31_.7_78OO 3.404HB
3712+6778ge 3.885734
715+_INI1041 1.457147
71.484?M i.07377i
H.011310 1.115T}3
iS.8S4414 4.138N_
81.4_ 0.154038
81.433I_e 0.137137
227,478_ 1.2$oglI
2]:1.4128,141 I+34133118
?,627837 1217651
7.571_105 t.222751
44_I.|22010 5.7_3232
?344.N_Nkl 11.3071_1
SL
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Table_.2.1
SAFD Simulation Of Hot-Fire Test 901-364
Values For N2*
Case I
N2 *
- SD pre-computed
N2 - 1
Cases II,III
N2 * G
_- SD computed on line
N2 _ 8
1 Sec Injector Faceplate _P
2 Prim Injector Faceplate _P
3 Hot Gas Injector 4P
4 Coolant Liner _P
5 HPFT _P
6 HPOT _P
7 MCC Ox InJ P - MCC PC
8 HPFP Ds P - MCC PC
9 MCC PC
10 MCC Coolant Ds T
ii HPFP Speed
12 HPFT Ds T1 A
13 HPFT Ds T1 B
14 HPOT Ds T1
15 HPOT Ds T2
16 Facility Ox Flowmeter Ds P
_/'_:17 Engine Ox Inlet P
18 LPOP Ds P
19 HEX Int P
20 HEX Int T
21 HEX Vent EP
22 OPOV Act Position
23 FPOV Act Position
24.53 22.08
29.46 20.48
20.0 27.12
46.5 31.44
31.6 21.28
38.97 34.0
21.2 28.0
6.3 1.6
184.2 130.72
38.78 24.64
30.56 17.36
18.39 14.56
32.3 8.96
5.88 6.32
4.75 3.12
20.94 4.8
27.95 15.68
10.08 3.36
1.83 0.32
0.759 0.68
1.2 0.864
Case I Simulation cutoff at 214.553 seconds
Cases II,III Simulation cutoff at 206.75 and 205.75 seconds, respectively
SD - Standard Deviation
N2 - Multiplying factor for Approach-2
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Table 6.2.3
Signal Limit Composition, Test 750-285
Parameter Slgnal Limlt Signal Llmlt n
Average (AVG) Standard Deviation (SD)
OPOV Actuator 68. 0.2 :_'-, "2- 63.
Position
HPOTP Coolant 3614. 5.0 7.8
Liner Pressure
HPOTP Intermediate
Seal Purge Pressure
275. 0.6 38.5
HPOT Dis Temp A
HPOT Dls Temp B
1435. 1.94 7. I
1464. 1.5 /' _ 19.7
LPOP DIs Pres
Oxidizer Preburner
Boost Pump Dls Pres
FPOV Actuator
Position
355. 0.83 3.8
7944. 16.79 2.5
83 1.0 /.0 50
Note: Signal limits, defined by AVGtn*SD. are shown.clraphlcally
in Figures 5A1,2 through 5H1,2 for selected parameters
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!TABLE 6.2.4
Simulation Results For Test 901-340
n2
26
26
26.
27
#P c/o (seconds)
6 279.67
7 295.42
8 none
7 298.7
redline cutoff: 405.5
_ 71:;i
TABLE 6.2.5
Simulation Results For Test 902-471
nl #P c/o (seconds)
2.5 4 146.24
2.5 5 146.28
2.5 6 146.28
2.5 7 146.76
2.5 8 146.76
2.0 6 50.68 (premature)
3.5 6 none
redlinecutoff: 147.68
Where n l,n2 - Multilplying factor which determines signal limits for Approaches-1,2.
#P - The number of parameters experiencing anomalies simultaneously
required for algorithm to signal a shutdown,
c/o - The algorithm shutdown (cutoff) time.
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Slmulation Run No.
TABLE _.2.6
COMPARISON OF RESULIS, Simulation for Test 901-340
N2 No. Parameters Required
For Shutdown
SAFO
Shutdown Time (Sec)
1 19 4 22.04
2 17 7 21.0
3 17 4 20.28
4 16 4 19.8
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PARAMETER DESCRIPTION
FUEL PREBURNER TEMP
OX PREBURNER TEMP
OX PREBURNER PRESSURE
MAIN CHAMBER PRESSURE
HPOP DISCHARGE PRESSURE
HPFP DISCHARGE PRESSURE
FPOV POSITION
OPOV POSITION
BOOST PUMP DIS PRESSURE
MAIN CHAMBER MIX RATIO
TABLE 6.4.1
PERCENT CHANGE FROM NOMINAL
1 lb-sec 5 ib-sec
leak leak
-.279 -1.40
-.743 -2.16
-.228 -1.18
-.192 -0.99
-.255 -1.32
-.188 -0.97
-.182 0.70
-.125 1.20
-.454 -2.32
-.265 -0.76
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FIGURES
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FIGURE I. Pressurization/Venting Effects on Parameters
/ENG 7-o/f - TEST _o_- _'_'I
THRU_IT PROFILE
" _? RPL ' 44r_7_-109_ 135.
I k
"I
liO--_ ,-,._,',_#r_ _/_ _o_ ¢,7£'.77o_
• ,_ _ 400
• ." .._rr_,_ Lox .......=_.l._Pr
VALVE@zoo sE_ITIATE PROP£LLAN'T
RkNBFE---RL&__[LV[NT,_,I_",_FCLOS[OOXREPRESS
• I 0 _I[[:IPZO s"c" " 'r VAkV£ q11120 8[C
_',-.,.._1 10 6,o *:tl-o NPSP
T,M_r_0N[/S -sEcs
mJIL__. 219 _ l)l_t PR R
....... 2_ll _ INLET I_ B
58e
25_
-25C
-5_
-75B
TIE FR_ ENGINE STRRT ,ECS
116: I
i
5_-: ,
II
m .......... 7r_ I.I_ _D llrl}
,,T ,_, _,,,._,,, ,,,,I,,,,1",,,i
ll8 I I} 2RB 2! [} 30{} 3_'l_
TIlE FR0tl ENGINE STP_T ,SEES
24_1m
t lr_eB
b
1575e
.
i ... 155B_ -
.:
_ _ .
1475e" , ....
....
i._
r
I ,
r'
, !
i
i '
TIE FR011 ENGINE ST_T ,SEES
_"_ '_:_
}I_ l.ll
i_1 2_ 14=0TOS11_ R 42 mOVRCT_SR (mv_)
t5
25.'
8
A
1[.i
"2
t .... _ ...... I,,,
_58| .... _,,, ; .... I,,,
00 158 B_ _5_ , ,
TIlE FROM ENGINE STI_T ,SEES
t k--
I1_ tIM
B5:
B41
82! , :
I
1
_: : , ,
7_:1 ................... i ...........
0 ' 1118 1_ 20 2{{} _lle 3!_ ,
TIE FR011 ENGINE ST_T ,SEES
i
FIGURE 2. Closure of GOX and Fluid Repressurization Valyes'
Effect on Parameters
-x._ _ i,
ev-)
i.k.
._,.-
_" :j
A
u)
in
epnllldtUV lueLue_nsee_
-86-
-t-
O
c_
n.-
i,i
c_
I
O
.J
(./I
!
n,"
L._
I
0
U'I
(3J
C_
aS_a._eAV-ed0IS
0
I
-87-
r-
L
\ -+.t I
0
0
0
!
-88-
I'-
Mm--
I
I.
x
orn
ri i !
I i I !
/il \_ i
-'7,_--{_--]
,,\,,
;i % =e,-
i
I
{
I ..... ,
I
I
I
I
1
;I
!
6)
0
e---
I
NOIlI_d IH]=_J_
/
U
b_
E
0p- °_
o
v
o
7
o
U
_J
Ill
I
J
i
u _.J
tn
o _j
o
I_ 0e--
¢0 ,r'-
_ o
! I.
u
I
u
,m-
a6R._a^v-ado LS
-89-
E_
I
m4t P@4@ O:_V RCT POSIT (DPV/)
..:.J
70-
68"
67-
66-
65-I
B4-
65-" ....
2
0
I
t
75 I_
5_ 100
//,,
/
J i
I ..... i .
i + ' l l I + < I +
15_
TIME FROM ENGINE STRRT ,SECS
Lr)
u_
l--
(._
U.J
I--
c_z
cxz
Figure 5AI
r_
rY
Z
C)
CJ
I i + +
175 2;!5
208
Algorithm start:
3=
O
13.
llJ
Is
_B
L
i
I
/
!
i
i
+il
,.. , J n_ . j--'_,,,e_,_._.%]W' +"
"Vr' / I
I I /
.<'/Sn/fw_ /..]_'_+_'-"
•j /
U---
I
100 secso
I+0. @
T %PIE-SECON@S
Figure 5A2
Test 750-285
-90-
200.0
_r._ HPF'P CLT I,.II',[R P(HSDFI)
3450.
3350-
25
0
/
/
•_Eg.r,_,_,_F,,v-r .r/M4_
I i i i _ "
t
i
i
t
; , _ i i l i
i .... 1½5
p_
I--
I---
0
,.,,.,
t.l
J
._J
0
r,,,-
0
LJ
L,,J
175 225
58 150 288
TIME FROM ENGINE STRRT ,SECS
Figure 5B1
Algorithm start: 100 seconds
-%1:;.
|
I i
Ii i
|
..... 4, o°. ................ .
]
I
ttUi I /
-" (
I
I .
I
T | NI[os£CONQS
Figure 5B2 - Test 750-285
-91-
_m _1211 _ IMSL I=6P A (IS_q)
2gg"
27g"
!,
J
/
/
I
22(
.11
r _
f _
j _
75 t
g 50 18g t58
TIME FROM ENGINE STGRT ,SECS
!
Figure 5C1
C_
_J
.._1
i-.'-
z
c_
(_3
l-,J
U'3
0"3
!75
288
_5
Algorithm start:
i
!
' i
2 / / /
/
/
i
100 seceded
) 0,0
T ( I'tr-$1[COkl_$
Figure
200.0
5C2 - Test 750-285
.CIP_
%u
_2_ _OT TUROS T A (OTI)B)
1500
1475
1458
1425
I
1488
1375
I_50 ,,
0
A
I I
I l
_Arv
I
1
t
I
,I
!
I,
./
/
i
[
i ! L
''25 ........ 75I'""'_' '. ,1125.... ''' 1_5
50 100 150
TIME FROM ENGINE START ,SECS
_1_
Figure 5DI
uC_
CO
)...
or)
= "'. I,I
, IwN _-
_x, • C):C
i,
rr-
rw"
i.i
._J
0
r---
Z
t ; T' 'i
2_s
208
Algorithm start: 100 secor
i__
14,W
II
G I_t
o
I
w _
b. L|
1
_ II:11
I "'
I
.........1......i......"......i ,, I , i
•q ! ,. _:: --
LJif! , i_"_,nii'ti_,ni'Lilii./; "
A_iiiJlilll. 1 "11!_,_tliltltltilJ ./ IJ
i,tlltll_FIl[I I! !! " !4111!IlllltII
ll"-I"L/'l[lhnl I/I ,/_tr'" -11II I tlIll Z. I / II I11
'iI /t-i/.
, , I L/,'f'_t"i., _
/1 ' !
I I , I I ], Y I " _'
j ' ' I/I
, ..... I I
|_0,0
•. ? [ M[- SI[CDNOS
i - ' ! L
' 20O:0
Figure 51)2 - Test 750-285
-93-
">._./L]
_234 I'f_T 1"URDST B {OTDB)
1525
1500
1475
1458
1425
1400
1375
1350
i
I
i
I
I
i I i f l i i I
25
I
I I ''
,, I i
i
1
!
j\/w _
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
i i i t _ I i i'_
75
/.,/_,4.m.z,e,p._m,,v'r ..r';_,.A,,_I
1
I
!
1
ii • . J i _ I i I b i _ J ; , I 1
125 1")5
100 i50
c_
N
l--.-
cv
C_
C_
...J
c_
Z
(:3
( ! i ,
225
200
[ME FROM ENGINE STRRT ,SEC5
Figure 5EI
Algorithm start: 100 second
-. ..
_J
II
a_
d
W
!
I
e-
w 141
344
I
I
J
• _° .... _°° ...... °.-. .... --°4
I
I ,
i '
i
I
I
i
.o...o• ,o .... ,_ ..o .... +/
/ I
il.
|/
_n _ ,. -- 11 _, q _ .m.
.i_Jt"""u_l !. ,_ _ .,; iJT lult .... •
111II-- , , = : ,_ . _.!! / II 1 .....
IIU / ,_ _ ' ii i : _ "
.I
L
I
I
', I
I
I
| ,
,o°°..-|o°
!
i
L II
i
!
!
.... _--, i
I
I ! I _o.o ..... _, o:o '-
T I ml[-Sr _:ON_S
Figure 5E2 -T_st 750-285
-QZI.
or. Q'_ LPOPDSI_ESSR (LOPR)
.'r
7
355.
350.0-
547.5-
345.0-
i
1::5 175 225
50 100 150 200
TIME FROM ENGINE 5TRRT ,SEC5
Figure 5F1
Algorithm start: 100 seconds
!
Figure 5_2 TEst 750-285
t3_
__m n15g I_o OSPI_:_ (BSP2)
77_
7508-
I
/
75
58 180 [58
TIME FROM ENGINE STRRT ,SECS
Figure 561
/
200
r_
@
tf3
225
Algorithm start: 100 seconc
L_........._...........11..........i
iI I
I
/ I
t I I
200. @
Figure 5G2 - Test 750-285
-q6-
__42 FBOV BCT POSIT (R_VI)
B4-
B_
82.
81-
].-/E.eJ,_,eZ',+'E,vT" 4"I_,+'+,
7_
7_ .... 25f....... 7'5.... l,,,
0 5B 100
i i " ; ....
_5
150
TIME FROM ENGINE STRRT ,SECS
Figure ,5HI
I'5
p-.
.=
I,l
• a_il
_5
20B
Algorithm start: 100 secondt
I4.41
I ' '
I
I
I
...._ .......
13.S
.,....,._ __
i
i
Z
o_ I_,t
III l-
Z
l,d I
IJ
_ ,
I
Z,
I
I
i
i
I
I
i
I
-I
.I i
|m.Jl_iP
.I"ilUtlltjl_._
_II I UI II
I I - -
i
i
_ II_ . |rlltA
+lOt
.... I FIll
: !
I
. i
i
I
I
]'J0.0
T [ III[-SECONOS
i
i
i
i
.°.-_ ....--4-----
q
P i
II I
.t,jv r!....
IIl
_/
/
/
/
/
/
/
.s".4_-_,,P£ Z..*_,"7"C
i
=
i
'" f
//'
Iilll
200.0
Figure 5H2 - Test 750-285
_-+_ -97-
t'
I
o.....#..
/ I
!
l
|| I
l
-- mlO+ _ O_,_t_:q "RJImIM_ II"L"I'dW4_
--- _ _ llllo+),,kl (_ImlqOlo,+-I _ +nit Sa-ll"C 1110.1 ft'lll'r)
I
Vl
61,,
i
N
m
l
i
i
i
I
!
I
i
i
I
i
I
I
I
P .. I
IJ iI
II II
I
,1 I i_
LOO. D 200.0 3_0.0
TIMr -Si[CONOS _1
Figure 6AI High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine Delta-P, Measurement Signal
Test 901-340
I
I J J ! I
Figure 6A2 High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine Delta-P, SAFD Algorithm Signal Average
Test 901-340
-9B-
%. +
-c+..+.J +:
Figure6_1 High Pressure Fuel Turbine Delta-P, Measurement Signal
Test 901-340
I
I
L
t
O'RIGIIVAL PAGE IS
OF POoR QUALITy
Figure 6B2 High Pressure Fuel Turbine Delta-P, SAFD Algorithm Signal Average
Test 901-340
-99-
= _ grow ,c'r luwrr-,ii_.
v
z
o
o
m
z
I I
T
i
I t
Figure 6CI FPOV Actuator Position, Measurement Signal
Test 901-340
l
i
i
ORIGINAL PAOE I$
OF POOR QUALITY
I I I l
I I !
lO{
L T ! 8'1(. IECS_S J
Figure 6C2 FP0V Actuator Position, SAFD Algorithm Signal Average
Test 901-340
"-{...j:-. ,
L
i
i
I
.hi
,/t ......
/1
i
!1 j I I
, _ I i I
' ! II
11
I
I I
I
I I
t
i
,,, ,,
I
l
|00.0 200.0 _0O.0
TIM[-S[r._N{S J
Figure 6D1 HEX Vent Delta-P, Measurement Signal
Test 901-340
: /
L
Figure 6D2
I i I I I L I i
i ; I i I I
I._ _"'_ "_'- "_'"_'"'"
TZ_£-_CS_S
HEX Vent Delta-P, SAFD
Test 901-340
200.0
Algorithm Signal
3|0.8
.J
Average
. _ _g _ Slp|-.1Wil tdllRNltlID_ m[r-_ &T _1-_C _ S_lrlffl
z
I
t
t
1
300.0
J
Figure 6EI HEX Interface Pressure, Measurement Signal
Test 901-340
C
m
u
m
I/J
llr
w
IIII
U
IfI
I
I
. ., l, I_J_l , ,. I .L4,
I
J
|_ 1.0 200. 300.0
? I MI[ -$[C0N0S .J
OF POOR QUAL_T'-_
Figure 6E2 HEX Interface Pressure, SAFD Algorithm Signal Average
Test 901-340
-102-
Figure _,i High Pressure Fuel Pump Coolant Liner Delta-P, Measurement Signal
Test 901-340
Figure 6F2
J
I
!
! I_
I _ i
I
lOO. 0 0
I.. f [ m[ * S[COkOS ..i
High Pressure Fuel Pump Coolant Liner Delta-P, SAFD Algorithm Signal Average
Test 901-340
r-
I-IPOTDS TiP R
70 g@ i10
TIME FROM ENGINESTRRT,SECS
I
i
I
I
130 15B
Figure ?A High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine Discharge Temp. A, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
-I04-
I_3T DS T_ B
\ Z.;
14_
50 78 gB 110
TIME FROM ENGINE ST_T, SEC5
1
130 150
Figure 7B High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine Discharge Temp.
Test 902-471
B, Measurement Signal
-105-
-' t
EI_ FL FL_ NF1)2_GPM
II Ll tiilll ,ll J ,liui...I .iJ ,..,,,, II]_ J,,t., _ll<lil -,. illi I IL,.J.. .... i.l i-
t
50 7B g@ 118
TIME FROM ENGINE STRRT, SEC5
139 150
Figure 7C Engine Fuel Flow, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
r!
-106-
-l_< "
w .,
H_P B_. C_V_ _ PSI5
4608
4558
I
4588
I
I
I
• , !
I
i
I
m
"
1
- I
4488 ,,,,,,,,,z ..... ,,,,l_,,,,,, ..... ,, ........... .,,,, .... -!,,,,,,,, ,,,_,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
60 EB 108 ' I 0
58 70 gB 118 150 158
TIME FROM ENGINE STRRT, SEC5
Figure 7D High Pressure Fuel Pump Balance Cavity Pressure, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
=107-
H_PDSF_A
5@ 78 g8 118
TIME FROM ENGINESTRRT,SEC5
13@ 158
Figure 7E High Pressure Oxidizer Pump Discharge Pressure A, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
-I08-
_PCB2
31
31
307_
3B_
il|lflll lilll lill Illlll
I I 1 II
In ltlll][llilllli IIll
I IIllll--,_ llllll
1 I
5B 70 gO 116
TIME FROMENGINESTRRT,SECS
138
148
I
rm'_
I
158
Figure 7F Main Combustion Chamber Pressure, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
-109-
\ i
_PFPDS PRR
B200
I
TIME FROM ENGINE 5TBRT, 5ECS
1
Figure 7G High Pressure Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure A, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
-110-
3425-
3400-
3375.
.,I I
I I
u!iliiit I_tl.__i!l_ f_iil!_iiltli Jill--
l!,,J
i jim
k
BO
50 70 90 110 130 150
TIME FROM ENOINE STRRT, $ECS
Figure T_ High Pressure Fuel Pump Coolant Liner Pressure A, Measurement Signal
Test 902-471
-111-
HX INT T
945
94B.
i
920-:
I
50 70 go 110 130
TIME FROM ENGINE START, SECS
!J
/
I
I.I
I
I
150
Figure 71" HEX Interface Temperature, Signal
Test 902-471
Measurement
-112-
_,- 14RrPCCO..NqTLII,,I_ rm TA.,.P
_ TI_ST g0 !o_,0
....... AVlN_ TI_ST gOlo_*0
.... AV'_I_ Ti_ gOlo_*0
----,------ AV3q_ _ gOl-_,*0
AVINOq, _ gOlo),bO
5OO
(_! SE'GI_ AT !_ _ START)
(_PsPlq0,JJ_,.,,l--IJU_.l_*_5AT IL_-.g_C _ _'rART)
(.6.=PR0,AD,P-I_I_ AT ILs..._EX_ START]
t_c:PAOAD"f-i_lJ'_ AT 1_ _ START)
¢N_PIq_-I E2)IIqS AT IL_...S£C_ START}
I
UJ
L,U
3OO
i
i
/
q
l
J
I..
!
i
i
i o
I
L-.. Al$_:'it.l",.u 8"caz'_s
20.0
12,0_ see,
FIGURE 8A
25.0
ORIGINAL -.G;_,_;
OF POOR QUALITY
-11R.
Recline
Cu_f:
_..i. ¸" :.
r" SD61_ _ gOl-_.tO (APPROAO_I EEl|MS AT I_=-4_ F'R3_ _'TAIR'T'3
....... AVININ _ gOl-_O (AFSPROAO_IgCGII_S AT I_=-_E_ _ START)
---..----- AV'3qI_ _ !101-3_0 |,gaPRI_Dt-I _EOII_ AT 1_ _ _'I'._ITI
t_
I.u
I
w
r_
I--
o.
t.-
1300
/
I
!V
L
1_
10.0
ii
i ls, oTIME-SECONDS
!
I
!._.._.l.goz't_.4m s_ts
20.0
12.08 seo,
FIGURE 8B
25.0
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
I
J
Redline /
c/oz _5.5
-114-
r" I_OH _ OX "n.l_IH[CSSEJ_15 TE3"T901-_.J0 {,kq::'_O_]_l EF..,_II,B AT IL:s-SE_FI:O5 _J._i')
....... A¥1NI5 TI[ST Sl01-]l._0 {,kcFR0,fb,O'_l _11_6 AT I.--5-e.E_I:"N3'1START)
.... A_'_HI5 _ gOl-2N0 {Af:F:ROAC].4-1EE_|_ AT I_.,._EC _ sT_qT)
----.--- AY2N[_ _ g0|-_P.*O [AF_ROAO'_I _I_ AT |_ F'RCi'ISTART)
-------- kVINI5 _ 901-340 (,k_F_:'_l Iw'nZl_,SAT IL:_SECFIq{_ START)
1800
IS30
IaJ
w I/er
I._ IqO0
0.
:C
W
In
/
/
r"
/_Lr
J
/
L
--L_ __1- _._
I._
I0.0 I5.0 20.0
I T l HE-SECONOS
[
L.-,x.lgoz-it_ s+.az-_.I 12.08 see.
25. o
• • • /
/
_e_line
c/o, _S.:
FIGURE 8C _11m_
5_Lg _ 901-_0
------,--- AV'_119 _ g01-340
_-,---- AVIN19 _ SIQI-_,IO
qO00
(A:quROa_:4-1 EE3;II_S AT IL:_SE:C_ b'T,_;'T)
(NuF:q_I EE3)I_ AT I_ F_ STkq'r)
¢_! EEOII_S AT IL:_-GE__ ST_T)
(kuF:qOa,O4-1 I_ZN5 AT tL_-CJ:CF'R31 ST._rr)
(_.aFq:lOAC}'f'l1_331_ AT 1_ _ S'I'A:TI")
ze-..1
L _--e_o
- LV)
W
t,U
i
J
/
t" p_...r - i
I."
/..q
10.0
L-
!
J ,, , ,.
I
I
i 1._.0 20.0
j, T I ME-SECONDS
[
klgoz_@uu u_'ts 12.08 see.
2.5.0
_J
Redline
c/o, _5o5 se
FIGURE 8D :
-116-
r-
HC INT TD4=
., _ TEST WI-_0
....... AViN20 _ g01-_q0
,--.--. A_ _ gol-_3LtO
-----.------ AVlNI_O _ gOl-_P.tO
(APPt:iO,eO.i-I BE_GIe,6AT 1_ _ STA.q"r)
{_! EE_I_II_I5AT 1_ _ g'TART)
(,tF_=t::;O,ACS..t-!s:c'r-l_ AT IL=....:J_C_ S_'ART_
(Ai:FCSl:_:_,tC:I,..t-IE1£01_,,6AT 12-,SE_: _ gT,l_'T)
Ig- l
I
t.
I,-
O_
O.
i,-
L
_0
I00
J
10.0
J
;I
K/
[
/
/
E..
/-
f
Y
!
I
.... .I
I
I
I
I[
I
!
f
15.0 20.0 25.0
TIME-SECONDS
l__..q_.go_._l'm s_azts 12.08 sec.
j_
f
i
_J
Q •
]_edllne
C/01 _._o_ s(
FIGURE 8E -117-
.-----.----- A_! _ 90]-_
m
M
4me
CL.
UJ
U')
t_
0- 8O
. A_ Ikt,l, ll_ll|! flitted I_[|_-V V ||l ||'
,m
-D
-...j ;
I0.0
L.
I
(
t
I
i I
I
15.0
TIHE-SECONDS
20.0
12.08 emo.
25.0
'"I
Redl:l.r_.e
FIGURE8F -118-
r- F'For _'T F_6ITICNSE_6_ TEST 901-_0
.... AV'd_3 TE_ 901-3_0
---.------- AV3,_3 TE3"TgOl-_O
.------ AVlI_3 _ 901-340
S
Z
0
III
I,--
area
C_
G.
Z
ILl
¢.)
n-
O,.
l_
. 1
,/ _ILJL
R
10.0
........... F _l
IU IlU U li|
cl _s'_x,e-.coNos 20.o
I
I
Algoz"L_.: s+,a:%l 12.08 sec.
iiin_
_UUV
U
!_ ll.t_Ut IIU J] I_ vll_hl PllvL ._
25.0 !
0(}_1
FIGURE 8G -119-
I'"
....... AVII_ _ ¢Z'_I-_IO CAPFT_+-| BE:OII_ AT |_C _ _I',k/TI')
AV[I,_ _ 9OI-:_NO X.4_=RO_! E33Ir,G AT ILD.-_r. F'F[_ STJ_r}
r-"
/
F'
.__fl..v .y v v ruv __
._ _w_ J-v-o7ul_ r
• L . | _Tr
l
Z
0
I,--'
llm
(31
0
Q.
I,,-
Z
b.I
(.1
U4
Q.
./
m
,, ,m I
L_
10.0 I 15.0 20.0
T I ME-SECONOS!
I
L___ ._lgori+.h: s_tt 12.08 see.
2S. 0
""I
Redline
c/o, _o_.5
FIGURE 8H l_n
_.- HZOH_ IrUO- 11.lqINC I_ELTk-P$E)_05 _ 901-2k0 (Aqq:qOK2_l £E_IHS AT 12-_C: _ SI"_T)
....... A¥1N05 _ 901-340 (_1 B_I_ AT 12"_C _ START)
.... AV'_I_ _ 901-_t0 (_1 _'I)INS AT 12-_C _ STrip,T)
----..--- AY'_J41_5 11_ 901-_0 (_:W)_+-I El)INS AT 12-_C FW_ ST_1_r)
A¥IH05 11_ 901-3.0 _1 G_INS AT 12--_C Fl_ ST_J_T)
1900
L
1800
I0,0 25.0
FIGURE 81 I_I
F
0000
I
J
/
2 7
l--
Z
n
Z
l--
0
m.O
_'9°0
_l_.O
40.0
W°O
20.9
°/
t_
_.0 LO 9.O 4.Q
TIME- SECONI)S
FIGURE 9A-Test 901-284
6.O
J
-122-
_w_J )
• y
F-
0000
s7
I--
Z
Q.
Z
C)
O'J
C_
n.
_°0
W°O
40°o
_le°@
JJ°o
g
8 1.0 P..O LI
TZPIE- _ECONDS
4.O
0
0
rLO
FIGURE 9B - Test 901-284
_J
-123-
F-
0000
"-I
n
0 1.0 P.08
FIGURE
-124-
9C - Test 901-284
OF POOR QUALITY
F-
0000
IIPOT I'J,IR DIS T &
tllOG AI"PIT_ _1"IML'TM _ tM_I'X'ZON 1I._ _ /_OC)_ DATA
UP..n_lO
I.d
I
Ld
IX
I-.-
LU
s-
L,Li
!'--
0
L
U
• 1.0 LO I1.,8
TIME- SECONDS
O.RIQtNAL PAGE ,IS
OF POOR QUALITY
FIGURE 9D - Test 901-284
-125- °
-,.,,
r=,,o
.J
-:_ {
V
F-
0000
6--1
91
1.QOX18
C_
f.-
_'Y LOOnO
Ld
I-
X
4--1
E
W
0
0 4
(
d)
0
9
ep
0
0
9
LO L8
TIME- SECONDS
4.0 _.0
FIGURE 9F - Test 901-284
-126-
F-
0000
NCC CLKr DIS PR
P(6) All=OTII SI"_RT W CN'r AIX)Tn_l 1,1J89 _ _D_/.- _AT-A
1";' _ CLk'T gS SS_ _ IX_TA FOR TEST _1284 -r'_-_T" DA'r'_
t
"7
48O8
gS_
S000
_ .,(
Or)
(1. 2SO0
Ld
:_) 2000
Q')
Ld
1_=00
1000
SO0
,_o°°_
I
/
/
L
o O
0
o_,
.... Lm.
v
1J P.,| LO
TIME- SECONDS
4.D S.O
FIGURE 9G -Test 901-284
-127-
JF-
OPB_
--P_P
0000
-1
4OOO
gSO@
0
0
1_0o
0
L
FIGURE 9H - Test 901-284
-128-
r-
0000
I'¢C PC
PCI£
38a
RI'P0_ Sl'J_I" M _ _01"rz0N 11/89 _ _OC_.;- £)P,'i-/:_
t'ICCPC 1 PSI SSl/E C:0Nt'N]I.U_ DAT_ FOR TEST c;01284 "T'E_T" DA_A
'_"I
m
Ix.
i
Ld
O3
U_
_0.0
2000°0
I
0
O°
4.8
.J
FIGURE gl - Test 901-284
-129-
",._j
F-
0000
P_ _TPOltl=rralclr_icl¢r¢OOII"ION 11/89 _ IvIOD_L. DATA
HPOP _ PR M r _ CONI_ _T_I F_ TI_ _I_ "T'ESF I_T'A
i|
89/%2ko?
oR'rLOOK xo --j
9600.0
8BO0.O
4: 2600.0
05
n
I
l lJ
D00.0
Xr_l).0
3000.11
TA0.$
#
\
0
I
:1.8 8,,0
TIME - SECONDS
FIGURE 9J - Test
4,,0 LO
-O_GIN._L FAGE IS
901-284 OF POOR QUALITY
=J
-130-
F-
0000
"7
5009.8
4400.8
vrl
b')
LU
2000°$
_lOa.I
I_
V
J
/
ORI_ii_I_l. PAGE IS
OF POOR QUaLiTY
:/
0
_7
0
O0
P..O I.tl 4.0
TIME- SECONDS
L,O
FIGURE 9K - Test 901-284
-131-
F-
0000
04
2. OX,lO
CJ
_.1
0
I
0
..J
I.i.
,-.e.OXlO
L
\j
O4
0
I
1.Q 2.8 L8 4.0
TIME- SECONDS
L.O
FIGURE 9L - Test 901-284
-132-
IlC: corI_STION C].IN'EER I_ESSl.mE 1o..-I
_"l
!
\
7ori.E__E:_.Ds18o
=-_ _-,t TestOa,
Model Data i"7_
_9o
a PID 200
2OO
_J
m
i
m
st , _ PI
I
J
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF-POOR QUALITY
FIGURE IOA - Test 902-428 -133- ,-
F
_vr_zom_71mm1=o HPOT Dis Temp CH B
"r_ R_JJ.II_ TEST _:_
1400.0
Lfl
!
J200.0
UJ
I--
C2:
Z_J
D.
T
LLJ
F-
I
M,del Data
\
Test Da:a PID 23
170 180 190 200
TIME-SECDND_ .J
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
FIGURE 10C - TestgOZ-428
-135-
OR,G_.%AL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
I- TOI_L_ IEAT EX "[1_!PFA_&J.IE _ aj_
_,,o_4 44-- i
"n3h'V000
1400°4
I
I--
rv
Ld
LIJ
I--
170 180 190
TIME-SECONDS
2OO
_J
O_ FC_UR QU_.LF_
FIGURE IOD - Test 902-428
-136-
F-
Ita_ O._BER rm(TURS mT_
R_LUIE TE3T _2--J28
_'1
't.,O
L
C_
w
I-.
h-
I
uJ
==
I.-
X
Ik,.I
's'..
60 70 TI_- S£C_SN_S
Model Di
190
%%
,_ .._,
()ataPID
2OO
2616
.J
•.,,.._ _{O_G,,_L PAGE IS
OF POOR QUAt.ITY
FIGURE 10E - Test 902-428
-137-
F- FLEL PRE_I_ R_SSU_F_JLJ,E_ TE_'T 90L:D-.4_
e 7
qbO00.O
_._.+]i
<:
Itml
(,0
I=- SOoO.O
I
l.,d
i"I"
(,11
131
UJ
13::
0,.
4000°0
ii
\\
\
Model Data .,,d\
\
)ata PID
60 170 180
T_'ME - SECDNDS
190 200
O;_+,_._AL PAGE IS
OF, POOR QUALITY
ORIG!NAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
1.10
_J
FIGURE !OF - Test 902-428 -138-
F- PRE$$LIE 0X.W_ZmR PRE_RI_qFAT.UJIE "MESTgO_'.-._B 9_
4rsm..8
ol
D., 40_0°0
I
op)
rv,
o.
I
u
5o 1 _u
T_ME - SECONDS
Model Data j4_k_
iu
k._/ Test Data
I
I
_u
ORiG_NAE PAGE !_
OF POOR _UA, _,'_,,
FIGURE IOG - Test 902-428
-_-_,,'-m_.w PAGE IS
OF POOR OUALJTY
-139-
PII 480
'4
t.2
t.t
I
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
O;,-zz
204 206
Fi8ure 11A Fuel Leakage Flow
FUEL IEAICA GE FL 0 _.
_ODEt. TEST ?50-RS_r
!
i i i' I i '_' "i i ' i" i i i i i i I |
208 2fO 212 214 216 2f8 2._0 _ 2.24
TIME 69ECOITDS;
HWF TLR OS T B
Figure 11B Fd.gh Pressure Fuel Turbine Discharge Temperature
(e'Toe)
178(8!
l
1778 i
1768"
285.8 2!8.8 21E.8
TIrE FROM _GINE $TRRT ,_C5
-140-
DT=LI_
ORIGINAL PAGE IS.
OF POOR QUAUTY
Figure 11C- High Pressure Oxidizer Turbine Discharge Temperature
2;4 HPOTfUR OS r B (oroB)
1488 !
i!ii
1418 :
1400 i
2_0.8 205.8
I I
I
.... '_""' ' ' 222.5212.5 2;-_5"'2:0.a 2:.=.0 2__0._
Ti_E FROM ENGINE START ,5EC5
p..,.
(,.,J
225.0
d.aS-,¢'_
01- I.i_1
IIOIT
Figure11D Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve Position
,m opovET mszT ((_wz)
6g
6g.
68.
67.
205.8 218.8 215.8
TIHE FROM _GINE STRRT ,SECS
-141-
225.0
Of- 1.141
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
1 T
NIPl
Figure _E Main Combustion Chamber Pressure
(_:)
5225
3208, 2@2.5 28,_..= 2!: ,. _
286.8 285.8 2!@.8
_TA
U_
C_
c_
C_
L_J
--J
U
121 I
........ ...22 ,,=.,.,
2Z_..8 229.0 225.8
TIME FROM DNGINE STRRT ,SEES _,. DS-,."O
DT,,, i.141
•...r_ _
Fisure 11F Mixture Eatio
e ex _TIO .(exRt)
. -,
°l [,I,
_., ,,ll_lli'l'l el".'
I
I I I ¸
IrFKifll"i_'f_l_fl'Ff'!lr'ltflll_
"_1' ] '1" " Ii_
k--
,u'1
286.6 205.6 218.6 215.0
TIE FROM ENGINE ST_T ,SEES
-142-
228.8 225.6
dI.M,._'O
Of-II.IMI
OR|G,,_AL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALIT'Y
- /
_.1
r,
tJ
E
e-
(.3
0
o_,,.
-143-
OIIlGIP+ALPAG[ IS
OF POOR QUALiT+,
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TABLE 6.5.1
IO PARAMETER DESCRIPTION TRANSIENT MODEL
VARIABLE
SAFD VARIABLE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
_--/ g
I0
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
"L. _J
HPFT Radial Accel
HPFP Balance Cavity Pres.
HPOT Dis. Pres.
HPOTP Intermediate Seal
Purge Pres.
HPOTP Secondary Seal
Drain Pres.
HPOTP bBoost Pump Dis.Pres.
HPOTP Boost Pump Radial
HPOTP Boost Pump Bearing
Coolant Dis. Temp.
MCC PC
MCC Liner Cavity Pres.
HPFP Speed (RPM)
HPFT DS T1A
HPFT DS T1 B
HPOT DS T1
HPOT DS T2
LPFTP Shaft Speed (RPM)
LPOTP Pump Dis. Pres.,
HPFT DIS.PRES.
HPFTP Coolant Liner Pres.
HEX Int. Temp
HEX Vent Delta Pres.
OPOV Actuator Position
FPOV Actuator Position
Fuel Flowmeter
POT2D
POD3
PC1E
ENF2
TFT2D
TFT2D
TOT2D
TOT2D
ENFI
POOl
PFT2D
PTD
XOPOV
XFPOV
DW(2)
PARAM(1)
PARAM(2)
PARAM(3)
PARAM(4)
PARAM(5)
PARAM(6)
PARAM(7)
PARAM(8)
PARAM(9)
PARAM(IO)
PARAM(II)
PARAM(12)
PARAM(13)
PARAM(14)
PARAM(IS)
PARAM(16)
PARAM(17)
PARAM(18)
PARAM(19)
PARAM(20)
PARAM(21)
PARAM(22)
PARAM(23)
PARAM(24)
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of blockage Approach 2
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Figure 15D - Closed-Loop Simulation
of blockage Approach 2
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Figure 15E - Closed-Loop Simulation
of blockage Approach 2
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Figure 15F - Closed-Loop Simulation
of blockage Approach 2
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